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I. INTRODUCTION
In R. v'Big M Drug Mart Ltd.1 and R. v Oakes,2 the justices
of the Supreme Court of Canada developed an analytical framework
within which to approach cases arising for decision under the
CanadianCharterof Rights and Freedoms.3 In this paper I describe
and discuss the broad outlines of this analytical framework.
Chief Justice Dickson wrote the majority decisions in both
Big M and Oakes.4 The language he used suggests that the justices
of the Supreme Court intended judges applying the Charter to
embrace judicial activism and readily invalidate legislation in order
to protect the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter. I
argue, however, that the doctrine making up the analytical
framework is neither determinate nor determinative of judicial
decisions, and therefore that the framework dictates neither activism
with a view to protecting the Charter rights and freedoms, nor

1(1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321 [hereinafter Big M cited to D.L.R.].
2(1986), [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200 [hereinafter Oakes cited to D.L.R.].
3
Part I of the ConstitutionA¢4 1982, being Schedule B of the CanadaAct1982 (U.K.), 1982,
c. 11 [hereinafter Charter].

4

1n Big M, Beetz, McIntyre, Chouinard and Lamer JJ. concurred with Dickson J. Wilson

J. agreed in the result but wrote separate reasons. Ritchie J. participated in the hearing but
took no part in the judgment. The hearing took place before, and judgment was announced
after, Dickson J. was appointed Chief Justice; however, I shall refer to. Dickson J. as Chief
Justice with respect to this decision.

In Oakes, Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain JJ. concurred with Dickson CJ.
Estey 3. (McIntyre J. concurring) wrote separate reasons.
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restraint with a view to showing deference to the will of legislative
majorities. Accordingly, judges of the Supreme Court and of lower
courts may invoke the analytical framework to justify either judicial
activism or judicial restraint.
When I say that the doctrine making up the analytical
framework is neither determinate nor determinative of decisions, I
mean that it is uncertain in its application and does not serve to
control the decisions of judges. The framework indicates the range
of issues judges are to consider and the sorts of questions judges are
to ask when applying the Charter. However, it does not dictate
what answers judges must give to the questions they ask; nor does
it dictate whether judges uphold or invalidate the legislation
challenged in individual cases.
I do not intend to suggest that the justices of the Supreme
Court should have or could have developed determinative doctrine
that does control decision making, either their own or that of lower
court judges. Rather, I suggest that in adjudication under the
Charter, judges are led to the conclusions they reach as much by
their choice of values and their choice of role, that is their choice
whether to adopt judicial activism or restraint, as by the doctrine
they invoke.
The judicial tradition within which Canadian judges work
encourages judges to justify their decisions formally in terms of
rules. For this reason, Canadian judges often write reasons for
judgment that give the impression that doctrine plays a larger part
in adjudication than do the other two factors I have mentioned.
However, as rules are stated in general language and are applied to
particular facts, or in Charter cases to particular laws, judges may
apply rules in more than one way, and so may reach more than one
conclusion in an individual case. Therefore, the rules do not
determine the conclusions.
The discretion, leeway, or freedom in judicial decision
making can not be eliminated by encouraging judges to base their
decisions on policy. Statements about policy, like rules of law, are
couched in general language and are capable of various applications
to particular facts and statutes.
These are some of the assumptions I make in writing this
paper. I neither attempt to justify an approach based on these
assumptions, nor cite authority for it, for to do so would require a
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paper with a different focus from the one I have written. I note,
however, that the approach has a long history in North American
jurisprudence, and that elements of it were advanced in one form or6
5
another by at least some legal realists and judicial behaviouralists.
Applying these assumptions about the nature of
constitutional adjudication, I argue that at each step of the
analytical framework developed by the justices of the Supreme
Court to govern the application of the Charter, the rules are not
determinative of decision making; that judges have leeway in
applying the rules and doctrines; that judges may engage in
result-oriented decision making so that the results they wish to
achieve determine how they apply the doctrine, and that judges may
manipulate the doctrine in order to justify conclusions they reach on
the basis of their choice of values and their perception of the role
that it is appropriate for judges to play in constitutional
adjudication. Again, I do not mean to suggest that judges should
not have the leeway that enables them to manipulate doctrine and
engage in result-oriented decision making. These are irreducible
elements of judicial decision making.
The Supreme Court has indicated that Charteranalysis takes
place in two stages.7 First, judges are to consider whether an
impugned legislative provision "limits" a right or freedom. Second,
if the first question is answered in the affirmative, judges are to
consider whether the limit is valid under section 1 of the Charter
(unless they hold that it is the sort of limit that may not come
within section 1). I discuss the analysis in two parts that correspond
to these two inquiries, although I argue that the two are not as

5
W.E. Rumble, American Legal Realism, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1968) c. 2.
6

S.R. Peck, "ABehavioural Approach to the Judicial Process: Scalogram Analysis" (1967)

5 Osgoode Hall LJ. 1 at 1-4.
70akes, supra, note 2 at 223-24. As the Chief Justice noted, the justices "separat[ed] the
analysis into two components" in Big M, supra, note 1; Law Society of Upper Canada v.
Skapinker (1984), [1984] 1 S.C.R. 357, 9 D.L.R. (4th) 161 [hereinafter Skapinker cited to S.C.R.],
and Hunter v. Southam Inc. (1984), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641 [hereinafterHunter
cited to D.L.R.].
In Hunter, the hearing took place before, and judgment was announced after,
Dickson J. was appointed Chief Justice; however, I shall refer to Dickson J. as Chief Justice
with respect to this decision.
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separate and self-contained as the judges of the Supreme Court
have suggested.
In the first part of the paper, I discuss the first stage of the
analytical framework in which judges determine whether an
impugned legislative provision limits a right or freedom. This is
divided into two sections. In the first section, I consider the process
of defining the rights and freedoms; this entails a discussion of the
purposive approach to definition and of the relationship between
defining and balancing. In the second section, I consider the
process by which judges assess an impugned enactment. This
section contains a discussion of purposes and effects, and a
consideration of the concept of a limit of the sort that may not
came within section 1. In the second part of the paper, I discuss
the second stage of the analytical framework which is the section 1
analysis. This contains a treatment of the section 1 standard of
justification, the onus of proof in the section 1 analysis, the
requirement that a limit be prescribed by law, the requirements of
reasonableness and demonstrable justification which call for an
analysis of the purposes, means, and effects of challenged legislation,
and concluding comments on section 1.
II. THE FIRST STAGE OF CHARTER ANALYSIS:
DETERMINING WHETHER A LEGISLATIVE PROVISION
LIMITS A RIGHT OR FREEDOM
The first question judges examine is whether an impugned
legislative provision limits a right or freedom guaranteed by the
Charter. Whether a provision does so depends on two factors, the
scope of the right or freedom, and the nature of the provision. To
determine whether a legislative provision limits a Charter right or
freedom, a justice defines the scope or content of the right or
freedom, and assesses the legislative provision to determine whether
by its purposes or effects it limits the right or freedom as the latter
has been defined.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
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A. Defining the Rights and Freedoms

1. The purposive approach
The justices of the Supreme Court have indicated that in
their approach to the Charter they will bear in mind the special
features which distinguish a constitution from an ordinary statute.
A constitution is the fundamental document in the political structure
of a nation; it allocates legislative authority and limits that authority
in order to protect the values fundamental to society. As a
constitution is intended to endure, and as amendment of a
constitution is difficult, judges must interpret a constitution broadly
so that it remains meaningful in a changing society. In Hunter v.
Southam, Dickson cj., speaking for the Court, used the following
language:
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of construing

a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations. It is easily enacted and
as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an eye to the future.
Its function is to provide a continuing framework for the legitimate exercise of
governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a Charter of Rights, for the
unremitting protection of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions
cannot easily be repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of growth and
development over time to meet new social, political and historical realities often
unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the guardian of the Constitution and
must, in interpreting its provisions bear these considerations in mind. Professor Paul
Freund expressed this idea aptly when he admonished the American courts "not to
read he provisions of the Constitution like a last will and testament lest it become
one.'

The Chief Justice indicated that because the Charter has
special status as a constitutional document, judges are to give it a
broad, purposive, generous interpretation not a narrow and technical

8Hunter, ibid. at 649.
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interpretation.9 Judges are to interpret specific provisions of the
10
Charter "in the light of its larger objects."
In Big M, Dickson cJ. returned to the theme he had
explored in Hunter v. Southam that the Charter is a "purposive
document" whose purpose is "to guarantee and to protect, within

the limits of reason, the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms it
enshrines.
It is intended to constrain governmental action
inconsistent with those rights and freedoms...."11 In a brief but
important passage in Big M,12 he developed a three-part "purposive"
approach to the definition of a Charter right or freedom.
First, he said, "[t]he meaning of a right or freedom
guaranteed by the Charter was to be ascertained by an analysis of
the purpose of such a guarantee; it was to be understood ... in the

light of the interests it was meant to protect."
Second, to determine the purpose of a right or freedom,
judges are to consider four factors: (i) "the character and the larger

objects of the Charter itself," (ii) "the language chosen to articulate
Ibid. at 649-50. Dickson CJ. referred to Re Section 24 of B.N.A. Act (1929), [1930] 1
D.L.R. 98 (P.C.) in which Viscount Sankey referred to the British North America Act as "a
living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits," which should be given a
"large and liberal" not a "narrow and technical" interpretation. He also referred at 650 to the
statement of Lord Wilberforce in MinisterofHonseAffairs v. Fisher(1979), [1980] A.C. 319 that
the Bermudian Constitution (which incorporates a Bill of Rights) should be given "a generous
interpretation avoiding what has been called 'the austerity of tabulated legalism' suitable to give
to individuals the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to." He also
referred to M'Culloch v. State of Matyland (1819), 17 U.S. (4 Wheaton) 316 as support for a
"broad purposive analysis."
See also Estey J. in Skapinker,supra, note 7 at 365-68, cited by Lamer J. in Reference
Re Section 94(2) of the B.C.Motor VehicleAct (1985), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486 at 502, 24 D.L.R (4th)
536 at 549 [hereinafter B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference cited to S.C.R.].
1OHunter,supra, note 7 at 650.
11
1bid. at 650. Following Hunter, Le Dain J. invoked the purposive approach in R. v.
Therens (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.R. 613 at 641.
12

Supra, note 1, at 359-60. The passage reads as follows:
This Court has already, in some measure, set out the basic approach to be taken in
interpreting the Charter. In Hunter et al. v. Southan Inc. ... this Court expressed the
view that the proper approach to the definition of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed by the Charterwas a purposive one. The meaning of a right or freedom
guaranteed by the Charterwas to be ascertained by an analysis of the purpose of such
a guarantee; it was to be understood, in other words, in the light of the interests it
was meant to protect.
(...continued)
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the specific right or freedom," (iii)
"the historical origins of the
concepts enshrined," and (iv) "where applicable ...
the meaning and

purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is
associated within the text of the Charter."
Third, the definition of a right or freedom should be "a
generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the purpose
of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the
Charter's protection." The Chief Justice tempered this statement,
however, with the assertion that judges should not "overshoot the
actual purpose of the right or freedom"; he suggested that this
"overshooting" may be avoided by recalling that "the Charterwas not
enacted in a vacuum and must ...
be placed in its proper linguistic,

philosophic and historical context."
In a number of cases, justices of the Supreme Court have
applied elements of the purposive approach when defining the rights
and freedoms in the Charter. In Big M,13 Chief Justice Dickson
noted the historical origins of freedom of conscience and religion in
post-Reformation Europe. He reasoned that freedom of individual
conscience is central to such Charter-protected values as human
worth and dignity, and the functioning of democratic political
institutions. He noted14 that a free society is characterized by
diversity of beliefs and conduct, equality with respect to the

(continued...)

In my view, this analysis is to be undertaken, and the purpose of the right or freedom
in question is to be sought by reference to the character and the larger objects of the
Charter itself, to the language chosen to articulate the specific right or freedom, to

the historical origins of the concepts enshrined, and where applicable, to the meaning
and purpose of the other specific rights and freedoms with which it is associated
within the text of the Charter. The interpretation should be, as the judgment in
Southam emphasized, a generous rather than a legalistic one, aimed at fulfilling the
purpose of the guarantee and securing for individuals the full benefit of the Charter's

protection. At the same time it is important not to overshoot the actual purpose of
the right or freedom in question, but to recall that the Charterwas not enacted in

a vacuum, and must therefore, as this Court's decision in Law Society of Upper
Canada v. Skapinker ...
illustrates, be placed in its proper linguistic, philosophic and
historical contexts.

This passage is quoted, in part, in the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 9,
at 499-500 and in Oakes, supra, note 2 at 212.
13

14

Big M, ibid. at 360-61. See also 353-54.

Ibid. at 353-54.
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enjoyment of fundamental freedoms, and the absence of coercion.
He referred, too, to the concern evidenced by section 27 of the
Charterfor the multicultural heritage of Canadians.15 In the context
of the Charter purposes and the historical background to which he
referred, he defined freedom of conscience and religion to include
religious and conscientious belief, the expression of religious belief
and non-belief, and the right to participate in or refuse to
participate in religious practice.1 6 Defined in this way, the freedom
is limited by section 4 of the Lord's Day Act 17 prohibiting the
conduct of business on Sunday.
In Hunter v. Southam,1 8 when defining the section 8 right to
be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, Dickson ci., after
considering the common law history of the right, concluded that one
of the purposes of section 8 is the protection of a privacy interest.
To achieve this purpose it is necessary to prevent unjustified
searches before they take place. Therefore, he defined a reasonable
search and seizure as one that is conditioned on prior authorization
by an officer capable of acting judicially.
In Oakes,19 the Chief Justice defined the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty, contained in section 11(d) of
the Charter, in the light of the objective of the right which is to
protect the "fundamental liberty and human dignity" of persons
accused of criminal conduct. The right is "essential in a society
committed to fairness and social justice." After some reference to
the history of the right at common law and in international human
rights documents, he defined the right as requiring the state to bear
the burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt in
accordance with lawful procedures and fairness. Defined in this
way, the right is limited by the reverse onus provision challenged in
Oakes.
15

Ibid. at 354-55.

16

Ibid. at 361-65.

17

R.S.C. 1970, c. L-13.

8

1 Supra, note 7 at 650-53.
19

Supra, note 2 at 212-13.
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In the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference,20 Lamer J. stressed that
he was using the purposive approach to define the meaning of the
words "principles of fundamental justice" in section 7 of the Charter.
Using the language of the purposive approach, he considered the
language and structure of section 7, the interests the section was
intended to protect which he identified as life, liberty and security
of the person, the context in the Charter in which the words appear
which he identified as sections 8 to 14 and the history of the words
which he said is "shrouded in ambiguity." Finally, he referred to the
principles of fundamental justice as being "essential elements of a
system ... founded upon a belief in the dignity and worth of the
human person and the rule of law." He concluded that if section 7
is to give to life, liberty and security of the person protection as
great as that given by sections 8 to 14, the words "principles of
fundamental justice" must be defined to include not only procedural
guarantees but also substantive guarantees.
The purposive approach adopted by the justices of the
Supreme Court for the definition of Charterrights and freedoms has
a number of attractive features. Perhaps the most important of
these is that judges applying the purposive approach may not
rationalize the meanings they give to the rights and freedoms in
terms of technical legal analysis. Judges applying the purposive
approach must discuss values, social needs, competing interests and
policy alterhatives. A discussion of these matters is likely to reflect
the real reasons for judges' decisions more clearly than a discussion
of technical, legal matters.
By requiring a discussion of values and policies rather than
technical analysis, the purposive approach encourages judges to
direct their thinking to the social and political concerns affected by
the application of the Charter. Judges are encouraged to develop a
notion of the good society which reflects a conception of the nature
of individual rights and the legitimate exercise of power by
legislative majorities. The elaboration of the values protected by
the Charter will reflect a conception of the nature of man, the
nature of society, and the proper relationship between the two.
However, it is unlikely that a fully developed political philosophy

20

Supra, note 9 at 499-503 and 511-12.
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will evolve in the jurisprudence. The process of judicial review is
characterized by judicial responses to discrete issues over a period
of time by different justices under pressure of heavy workloads and
public expectations of expeditious decision making.
These
characteristics are not likely to produce a view of individual and
society cut of whole cloth. It is likely that even after many years of
decision making under the Charter, no fully developed view of the
good society will emerge, but rather a number of partial views
adopted by different judges at different periods of time.
The development of a policy-oriented jurisprudence resulting
from the application of the purposive approach will bring home the
policy-making role of judges not only to judges and lawyers, but also
to academics, the press, politicians, and the public. This will draw
attention to the question of the legitimacy of judicial decision
making under the Charter, that is, to the question whether it is
legitimate that in a democracy important policy decisions having the
broadest social, political and perhaps economic implications are
made by non-elected justices with power to review the policy
decisions of elected legislative majorities.
The use of the purposive approach will result in the
development in Canada of a literature, made up of judicial decisions
and academic writing, which focuses on a policy analysis of civil
liberties issues. This will likely lead to an increased awareness of
civil liberties issues among lawyers, academics, the press, politicians,
and the public.
Finally, the development of a policy-oriented jurisprudence
in Charter decisions may encourage the development of a
policy-oriented jurisprudence in other areas of law. Judges who
articulate their Charter decisions in terms of policy analysis that
touches on social, political and economic issues rather than in terms
of technical analysis may be encouraged to adopt a similar approach
in decisions in other areas of law. The adoption of the purposive
approach in Charter decisions may move Canadian jurisprudence
away from the "formal style" and toward the "grand style" of judicial
21
decision making.

21KN. Llewellyn, The Common Law Tradition: DecidingAppeals, (Boston: Little, Brown
and Co., 1960) at 35-40.
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For these reasons the development of the purposive
approach is to be welcomed. However, an assessment of the
approach must consider what effect it has when judges apply it in
the process of defining the rights and freedoms. Considered from
that point of view, the purposive approach is indeed no more than
an approach. It indicates the sorts of issues judges should consider
when defining the content of the rights and freedoms. However,
the purposive approach does not control the definitions judges
adopt in the sense that it does not dictate what those definitions
must be. Because the purposive approach is not determinative of
decisions, judges may manipulate the approach to justify definitions
they adopt on the basis of their choice of values and policies. To
say this is not to criticize the purposive approach or to suggest that
there is some better technique that might be adopted when defining
the rights and freedoms. Rather, it is to recognize the fact that an
irreducible element of judicial decision making is the making of
decisions, and that this involves choice based on values and policy
preferences.
Underlying the purposive approach, there is a recognition
that defining the rights and freedoms contained in the Charter is
neither a simple nor a mechanical task. The meaning of the terms
of a legislative provision does not inhere in the provision itself.
Judges do not discover meaning from the words; they assign
meaning to the words. This is particularly true of a document such
as the Charter which contains very general language relating to
abstract concepts used to articulate the nature of the social order
and the relationship between the individual and the state.
In some Charter decisions, justices of the Supreme Court of
Canada explicitly recognized the difficulties encountered when
defining terms used in the Charter. In Hunter v. Southam, Dickson
ci., speaking of the words "unreasonable search or seizure" in
section 8 of the Charter, said, "It is clear that the meaning of
'unreasonable' cannot be determined by recourse to a dictionary, nor
for that matter, by reference to the rules of statutory
construction. 22 In the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, Lamer J. noted

22

Supra, note 7 at 649.
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that "a single incontrovertible meaning is
not apparent" for the
'
phrase "principles of fundamental justice." 3
The core directive of the purposive approach is that to
determine the purposes of a right or freedom, and hence its
definition, judges are to consider the "character and the larger
objects of the Charter," the language used to state the right or
freedom, the history of the right or freedom, and the context of the
right or freedom in the Charter. These factors - purpose, language,
history, and context - are central to the well-established "rules" of
statutory construction. The notorious fact about these "rules" is that
they do not dictate meaning at all, but may be manipulated to
rationalize the selection of any one of a number of possible
24
meanings.
Let us consider first the reference to the "character and the
larger objects of the Charter itself."2 5 The character of the Charter
as a document entrenching rights and freedoms and authorizing
judges to prevent legislative abridgement of those rights and
freedoms does not of itself indicate the way in which particular
rights and freedoms should be construed. With respect to the
"larger objects of the Charter," we might refer to Oakes. There,
Dickson ci. said that the words "free and democratic society" in
section 1 indicate that the purpose for which the Charter was
adopted is to ensure that Canadian society is free and democratic.
He listed some of the "values and principles essential to a free and
democratic society." These include some values and principles that
relate to the interests of the individual -- "respect for the inherent
dignity of the human person" and "commitment to social justice and
equality"; some that relate to the heterogeneous character of
Canadian society --"accommodation of a wide variety of beliefs" and
''respect for cultural and group identity"; and some that relate to the
processes of parliamentary democracy -- "faith in social and political
institutions which enhance the participation of individuals and

23Supra, note 9 at 501.
24

For the classical Canadian critique of the rules of statutory construction see John Willis,

"Statute Interpretation in a Nutshell" (1938) 16 Can. Bar Rev. 1.
25See supra, note 12 and accompanying text.
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We should add to this list the values and

principles enunciated in section 27 of the Charter, the preservation
27
and enhancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians.
The values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society that the Chief Justice listed in Oakes appear to be some of
the "larger objects of the Charter" that he declared in Big M to be
reference points in the process of defining the rights and freedoms.
As indicated above,2' in Hunter, Big M, Oakes, and the B.C. Motor
Vehicle Reference the justices referred to some of these values and
principles when they defined the rights and freedoms using the
purposive approach.
However, judges will experience difficulty when they attempt
to define the rights and freedoms on the basis of these larger
objects. An appeal to "human dignity," "social justice," "equality," or
"group identity" does not of itself point to a particular definition of
a Charter right or freedom. The difficulty is that the justices of the
Supreme Court have substituted the general language in which they
stated the values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society, for the general language in which the rights and freedoms
29 Because these values and principles are
are stated in the Charter.
stated in general language, they require definition before they may
serve as a guide to the definition of the rights and freedoms. The
process of defining the values and principles is as complex as the
process of defining the rights and freedoms. Judges with different
views about the meaning of the values and principles, may invoke
the purposive approach to justify different definitions of the same
right or freedom.
There is another factor which suggests that judges will not
be directed to a particular definition of a right or freedom by a
consideration of the values and principles identified as essential to

26Supra, note 2 at 225.
27

See Big M, supra, note 1 at 354-55.

28Supra, text at notes 13 to 20.
29

Indeed, some of the values and principles, for example social justice, are more general

than some of the Charterrights, for example, the right to an interpreter.

1987]

The Application of the Charter

a free and democratic society. Chief Justice Dickson identified a
number of essential values and principles. Two justices attempting
to define the same right or freedom may invoke different values and
principles to justify different definitions. "Human dignity," "social
justice," and "respect for cultural and group identity" may lead in
different directions.
Chief Justice Dickson's statement of the purposive approach
indicates that the second factor judges are to consider when
determining the purposes of a right or freedom is the language in
which the right or freedom is stated. Clearly judges should refer to
this language. However, the language used to articulate the rights
and freedoms is the problem not the solution. With respect to
many of the rights and freedoms, the language is so general that it
does not indicate the purposes of the right or freedom!'
The third factor judges are to consider when determining the
purposes of a right or freedom is "the historical origins of the
concepts enshrined." This factor includes socio-political history; for
example, in Big Ms1 Dickson ci. referred to the development of
religious liberty in post-Reformation Europe. It also includes the
legal history of the right or freedom in statute and case law, not
only in Canada and the United Kingdom, but also in other
jurisdictions and in international human rights documents. Thus,
Chief Justice Dickson referred to the history of religious freedom in
Canadian jurisprudence,32 the history of the presumption of
innocence and the requirement of reasonable search and seizure in
English common law,33 the history of religious freedom, search and
seizure, and the presumption of innocence under the U.S. Bill of
Rights,3 4 and the history of the presumption of innocence in the

30See supra, text at notes 22-23. The guarantee of a right or freedom in the Charter,like
a provision of a simple Act of a legislature, may have more than one purpose. See, infra, text
at notes 82-86 and 163-65. In the text I use language to reflect this, where appropriate.
31

Supra, note 1 at 360-61.

32

Ibid. at 34448; 362-64.

330akes, supra, note 2 at 213; Hunter, supra, note 7 at 651.
34Big M, supra, note 1 at 348-49; Hunter, ibid. at 652; Oakes, ibid. at 220-21.
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms.3 5
It is certainly appropriate to consider the history of a right
or freedom to determine the purposes which the guarantee of the
right or freedom might serve. However, a consideration of history
(like a consideration of the larger objects of the Charter)is unlikely
to give a precise indication of the purposes of the guarantee. First,
it may be difficult to trace the history. In the B.C. Motor Vehicle
Reference, Lamer J. concluded that the history of the term
"fundamental justice" is "shrouded in ambiguity. '36 Second, history
may be inconclusive especially as judges are to consider the history
of a right or freedom in different jurisdictions. Some historical
trends may point to one purpose, and other historical trends to
another purpose for the guarantee of a right or freedom. Third, a
study of the history of the rights and freedoms is backward looking,
and if emphasized leads to definitions of the rights and freedoms
which are static and do not take into account changing social
conditions and attitudes.
Justices of the Supreme Court have recognized the
undesirability of this static quality of historical research with respect
to two sorts of historical inquiry. In the B.C. Motor Vehicle
Reference, 7 Lamer J. held that evidence given before the Special
Joint Committee of the Senate and of the House of Commons on
the Constitution of Canada is admissible evidence on the question
of the meaning of a right or freedom, but is to be given little
weight. One reason Lamer J. gave for this position is that if weight
is given to the views of individuals who testified before the Joint
Committee, "the rights, freedoms and values embodied in the
Charter in effect become frozen in time to the moment of adoption
with little or no possibility of growth, development and adjustment
to changing societal needs." Lamer J. concluded that "care must be
taken to ensure that historical materials, such as the Minutes of

350akes, ibid., at 221-22.
36Supra, note 9 at 512.
37

1bid. at 504-09.
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Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Joint Committee, do not
stunt (the Charter's)growth."38
Justices of the Supreme Court have also held, in a number
of decisions,39 that when defining the fights and freedoms judges
should not follow the definitions adopted in decisions made under
the Canadian Bill of Rights.40 The justices pointed out that the
Charteris a constitutional document and the Canadian Bill of Rights
is a simple Act of the federal Parliament. Further, justices
interpreted the Canadian Bill of Rights as recognizing and declaring
the rights and freedoms as they existed in 1960, and so defined the
rights and freedoms in the Bill in terms of the meanings they had in
1960. The definitions given to the rights and freedoms in the Bill
are not applicable to the rights and freedoms in the Charter as the
latter are not confined to the rights and freedoms as they existed in
1960, or for that matter in 1982.
The judges' rejection of these two elements of history, the
testimony of witnesses before the Special Joint Committee and the
jurisprudence under the Canadian Bill of Rights, suggests that
judges will not always be prepared to accept historical data as a
basis for defining the rights and freedoms. This supports the view
that history is not a certain guide to the discovery of purpose.
The fourth factor that Dickson cJ. said is useful as an
indicator of purpose is context, that is, "the meaning and purpose of
the other specific rights and freedoms with which (the right or
freedom being defined) is associated within the text of the Charter."
It is understandable that a judge should look to related rights or

38

Ibid. at 509. Lamer J. gave other reasons for his conclusion that little weight should be

given to this evidence. These include the following: it is wrong to give weight to the views of
individuals who testified before the Committee because a "multiplicity of actors" played major

roles in the negotiation and adoption of the Charter. We cannot assume that the testimony of
individuals before the Committee indicates the intention of Parliament and the provincial
legislatures at the time the Charterwas adopted. Indeed, the intention of these bodies is "a fact
which is nearly impossible of proof." See 507-09.
39

Big M, supra, note 1 at 359; Oakes, supra, note 2 at 214-17; B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference,

supra, note 9 at 509-11, Lamer J., Dickson CJ. and Beetz, Chouinard and Le Dain JJ.
concurring; Singh v. MinisterofEmployment and Immigration (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.L 177 at 209,

17 D.LR. (4th) 422 at 461-62, Wilson J., Dickson CJ. and Lamer J. concurring, R v. Therens,
supra, note 11 at 638-39, per Le Dain J., dissenting on other grounds.
40

S.C. 1960, c. 44, reprinted in R.S.C. 1970, App. HI.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[voL 25 NO. I

freedoms. However, as the definitions of the related rights and
freedoms are themselves uncertain, it is unlikely that a consideration
of the related rights and freedoms is sufficient to determine the
definition of the right or freedom with which the judge is primarily
concerned. Therefore, this fourth factor, like the first three, does
not control the process of defining the rights and freedoms.
Finally, the fact that there are four factors that judges are to
consider when determining the purposes of a right or freedom, itself
adds to the indetermination of the process. A consideration of the
"larger objects of the Charter" (the values and principles of a free
and democratic society) may suggest that a right or freedom has one
purpose, and a consideration of the history of the right or freedom
may suggest that it has another purpose.
In the third part 41 of the purposive approach, Dickson cj.
said that the definition of a right or freedom should be "generous"
in order to fulfil "the purpose of the guarantee" and to give the
individual "the full benefit of the Charter'sprotection"; but it should
not be too generous, that is, it should not "overshoot the actual
purpose of the right or freedom." He suggested that an overly
generous interpretation may be avoided by placing the Charter "in
its proper linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts."
The direction to be generous when defining the rights and
freedoms echoes statements made in several other decisions. 42 It
suggests that the Chief Justice intended justices of the Supreme
Court and lower courts actively to protect the values underlying the
Charter. However, as each judge may determine the appropriate
degree of generosity, the instruction to be generous does not
control the definitions to be adopted for the rights and freedoms.
The lack of precision in the instruction is increased by the
qualification that the definitions should not be too generous.
The statement relates the degree of generosity to the
purposes of a right or freedom; a definition should be broad enough
to give effect to the purposes for which a right or freedom is
guaranteed, but not broader. This reiterates the central theme of
the purposive approach. However, since judges have considerable
41

42

See supra, note 12 and accompanying text.
ee supra, notes 8 and 9, and accompanying text.
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leeway when they identify purpose, relating generosity to purpose
does not serve to control the notion of generosity.
The statement also relates generosity to the full benefit of
the Charters protection. However, the question, what is the "full
benefit of the Charter's protection," is precisely the question that
must be answered in the process of interpretation.
The statement suggests, further, that the appropriate degree
of generosity may be found by placing the Charter "in its proper
linguistic, philosophic and historical contexts."43 This may mean that
the scope of a right or freedom should be decided by reference to
the language in which the right or freedom is stated, its philosophy,
in the sense of purpose, and its history. If the statement means
this, it adds little to what has gone before. On the other hand, the
statement may mean that judges should consider the language,
philosophy, and history of the Charter as a whole, as opposed to the
language, philosophy (purpose), and history of a particular right or
freedom. However, even if this is what was intended it does not
control the degree of generosity to be shown in the interpretation
of an individual right or freedom.
The linguistic context of the Charter must ultimately be
reduced to the language used in the Charter to state particular
rights and freedoms in the context of other rights and freedoms. If
this is so, reference to the linguistic context of the Charter repeats
elements of the purposive approach discussed above.
It may be that the historical context of the Charter, too,
must be reduced to the history of particular rights and freedoms; if
so, reference to the historical context of the Charter adds little to
what has gone before.45 On the other hand, Dickson ci. may be
referring to the events in the 1970's and early 80's leading up to the
adoption of the Charter in 1982. If so, the reference to historical

43

But in Hunter,supra, note 7 at 649, the Chief Justice speaking of s. 8 of the Charter said,
'There is no specificity in the section beyond the bare guarantee of freedom from
"unreasonable" search and seizure; nor is there any particular historical, political or philosophic
context capable of providing an obvious gloss -. , the meaning of the guarantee."
44Supra, text at notes 22-23 and 30.

45Supra, text at notes 31-40.
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context is a new element. However, as I argue above, 46 history is
not likely to be a clear guide to the definition of a right or
freedom. In addition to the lack of a single historical explanation
of events, history, as a guide to interpretation, suffers from the
difficulty noted above that it is static and does not take into account
changing social conditions and attitudes.
The philosophic context of the Charter may mean no more
than "the character and larger objects of the Charter" discussed
above.47 If so, the reference to the philosophic context again adds
little to the statement of the purposive approach. If the reference
to the philosophic context was intended to encompass something
different, it is not clear what this is. Is the philosophic context one
of individual rights, group rights or societal rights? There are
elements in the Charter to support each of these positions. On the
other hand, the presence of section 1 in the Charter may suggest
that the philosophic context is not support for a particular type of
rights but a balancing of opposing interests. If that is so, the
philosophic context does not indicate how specific balances are to
be struck. If the reference to "philosophic context" is intended to
suggest that the Charter reflects a political philosophy, it is likely
that judges will not agree, except in the most general way, what that
political philosophy is.4
Accordingly, reference to philosophic
context does not control the degree of generosity to be shown in
the interpretation of a particular right or freedom.
I conclude that the purposive approach to the interpretation
of the rights and freedoms does not control the process of
interpretation. Judges have a great deal of discretion when they
determine the meaning of the rights and freedoms, because they
may manipulate the doctrine contained in the purposive approach.
The articulation of the purposes of a right or freedom is a complex
and creative process. Purpose is not an element contained within
the statement of a right or freedom which may be discovered by a
rigorous search. Purpose is determined by creative choices made by
46Supra, text at note 36.
47

Supra, text at notes 25-29.

48See supra, text at notes 26-29.
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individual judges. The determination of purpose is not controlled
by the instruction to consider the larger objects of the Charter,
language, history, and context because these factors are
Finally, the determination of purpose is not
indeterminate.
controlled by the direction that the rights and freedoms are to be
construed generously but not too generously.
2. The relationship between defining and balancing
The Supreme Court's decision to adopt a purposive
approach to the definition of the rights and freedoms calls for a
consideration of the relationship between the process of defining a
right or freedom and the process of balancing a right or freedom
against other interests. In the section 1 analysis, judges balance the
values underlying the rights and freedoms against competing values
that legislatures seek to pursue in legislative provisions. They do
this by considering whether the competing values are sufficiently
important to justify placing a limit on a right or freedom. 49 Judges
also balance values when they define a right or freedom. This is
perhaps especially true when judges adopt a purposive approach to
the definition of a right or freedom. I shall refer to the balancing
that takes place in the process of defining a right or freedom as
"definitional balancing"50 to distinguish it from the balancing that
takes place in the section 1 analysis.
A judge using the purposive approach who wishes to define
a guaranteed right or freedom as broadly as possible may do so by
holding that the purpose of the guarantee is to protect all values
that may conceivably be related to the right or freedom, and all
behaviour that may reflect those values. For example, a judge may
hold that the purpose of the guarantee of freedom of expression is
to protect all values that may be achieved through expression
including individual self-fulfillment, the search for knowledge,
participation in the democratic process, and the efficient working of
49See generally the discussion of the s. 1 analysis, infra.
50See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the FirstAmendment (New York:
Random House, Vintage Books, 1967) at 53-62 for a discussion of definitional balancing and
ad hoc balancing.
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the commercial market place.s 1 The judge will hold that freedom of
expression includes all expression, including the four types of
expression which reflect those values - artistic expression, scientific
expression, political expression, and commercial expression.
However, the purposive approach does not always lead
judges to adopt the broadest possible definition of a right or
freedom. If the approach did so, it would be unnecessary; judges
may adopt the broadest possible definition without reference to
purpose. The purposive approach contemplates that judges may
hold that the purpose of a right or freedom is to protect some but
not all values that may be related to the right or freedom. If a
judge decides, for example, that the sole purpose of freedom of
expression is to facilitate the functioning of democratic institutions,
the judge will define freedom of expression to include political
expression, but not expression directed to other purposes, such as
artistic and commercial expression.
In the passages in Hunter and Big M in which the purposive
approach is developed, 52 there is a suggestion that a purposive
approach must lead to a broad definition of a right or freedom, and
a technical, legalistic approach must lead to a narrow definition.
However, a legalistic approach, one that focuses on a technical
application of legal concepts and rules, may lead to a broad
definition; and, as the example given above illustrates, a purposive
approach may lead to a narrow definition. A purposive approach
leads to a narrow definition when judges applying the approach hold
that the purpose of the guarantee of the right or freedom is to
protect some but not all values that may be related to the right or
freedom.
If judges applying the purposive approach define freedom of
expression to include political but not commercial expression, they
are both defining freedom of expression and balancing values. The
choice of definition amounts to value balancing because it
determines that the values related to political expression are to be
preferred to all other values that government may pursue in
51

1bid. at 3-15. Emerson does not refer to the fourth value listed in the text; he discusses

an additional value - - maintaining a balance between social stability and change.
52

Supra, notes 8-12 and accompanying text.
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legislation unless government brings its legislation within section 1,
but that the values related to commercial expression are not to be
preferred to any other values government may choose to pursue.
Some of these considerations are illustrated in Re Klein and
Law Society of Upper Canada53 in which the Ontario Divisional
Court was called upon to decide whether freedom of expression
includes commercial expression.54 Callaghan J., speaking for the
majority, adopted a purposive approach to the definition of freedom
of expression.
He rejected as "a literal and purposeless
interpretation of the Charter" the view that judges should define
freedom of expression to include all expression and should consider
limits (that is, balance values) only under section L55 In a
discussion that shares with the Chief Justice's decision in Big M a
focus on history, the features of a democratic society, and the
context provided by other parts of the Charter,Callaghan J. referred
to pre-Charterdecisions that he regarded as extending protection to
political but not commercial expression,56 the importance of political
expression in a democratic society5 7 and the concern of the Charter
with political rights but not with economic matters 58 His conclusion
that freedom of expression includes political but not commercial

53(1985), 50 O.R. (2d) 118, 16 D.LR. (4th) 489 (Div. Ct) [hereinafter Klein cited to
D.LR.].
M4The applicants sought an order declaring the invalidity of rules, commentaries and
decisions of the Law Society of Upper Canada which severely restricted the extent to which
lawyers in Ontario might advertise the fees they charged for their services. Ibid. at 496 and
524-26.
55

bid. at 530 and 537-38.

56

bid. at 531. He referred toReferenceReAlberta Statutes (1938), [1938] S.C.Rt 100, [1938]
2 D.L.L 81, aff'd (1938), [1939] A.C. 117, [1938] 4 D.L.R 433 and GayAlliance TowardEquality
v. Vancouver Sun (1979), [1979] 2 S.C.R. 435, 97 D.LR (3d) 577 [hereinafter GayAlliance cited
to D.LRL].
57

KJein, ibid. at 532-33.

58

1bid. at 532.
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expression59 illustrates that the purposive approach may yield a
narrow definition of a right or freedom.
Henry J., who dissented, rejected Justice Callaghan's narrow
definition of freedom of expression. He also expressed a view of
the processes of defining and balancing that differs from that of
Callaghan J. and from that underlying the purposive approach. This
alternative view of the relationship between defining and balancing
insists that judges should define the rights and freedoms as
absolutes, and balance values only under section 1. Accordingly,
this alternative view is applicable only to the fundamental
freedoms6' and to the rights that are stated in the Charter in
unqualified terms. It is not applicable to the rights that are
qualified in the Charter by words such as "reasonable," for example,
the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure, as
qualified rights may not be defined as absolutes. 61 The alternative
view of the relationship between defining and balancing under the
Charter may be outlined as follows.
Judges should define as absolutes the unqualified rights and
the fundamental freedoms because the unqualified rights and the
fundamental freedoms are stated in the Charter as absolutes. It is
true that even the unqualified rights and the freedoms cannot be
treated as absolutes; legislatures may limit these rights and the
freedoms in order to pursue competing values. The Charter makes
explicit provision for this in section 1. If the Charter did not
contain section 1, judges would define the unqualified rights and the
freedoms as less than absolute in order to permit legislatures to
59
1bid. at 532 and 539. At 532 he left open the question whether freedom of expression
includes artistic expression.

60, assume in the statement in the text that s. 2(c) of the Charter is an absolute guarantee
of freedom of peaceful assembly. I recognize, however, that s. 2(c) may be regarded as a
qualified guarantee of freedom of assembly.
61Nevertheless, the alternative view was advanced in Re Soenen (1983), 3 D.L.R. (4th) 658,
[1984] 1 W.W.RL 71 (Alta. Q.B.) [hereinafter Soenen cited to D.L.RI], in which McDonald J.
considered qualified rights, namely the s. 12 right not to be subjected to any cruel and unusual
treatment or punishment, and the s. 8 right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
Notwithstanding the statement in the text, it is arguable that the alternative view of
the relationship between defining and balancing is applicable to unqualified aspects of the
qualified rights.

Examples of sections of the Charter that grant qualified rights include ss 8, 9, 10(a)
and (b), 11(a), (b), (d) and (e) and 12.

1987]
limit them.

The Application of the Charter
Judges in the United States define the rights and

freedoms guaranteed in the United States Bill of Rights as less than
absolute as the United States Bill of Rights does not contain a

section similar to section 1. However, it is not appropriate for
Canadian judges to limit the unqualified rights and the freedoms by
definition; to do so is to diminish the effect of section 1 which
explicitly states the only grounds on which the unqualified rights and
the freedoms may be limited. The structure of the Charterindicates

that judges should define the unqualified rights and the freedoms as
absolutes, and balance values only under section 1.62

62
See Klein, supra, note 53 at 498-503. In this passage, Henry J. spoke of the freedoms,
but not of the rights. He held that freedom of expression includes commercial expression, that
the Law Society rules, commentaries and decisions limit freedom of expression and that the
limit is not within s. 1 of the Charter. See 511.
In Soenen, supra, note 61 at 666-67, McDonald J. used the following language (which
forms part of a longer passage adopted by Henry J. in Klein at 502):
In the absence, in the U.S. Bill of Rights, of such a clause as the last part of s. 1, it
is not surprising that American courts have, in regard to the rights protected by the
Bill of Rights, found it necessary to limit them by judicial construction.... The
American courts have done what was obviously necessary, for each of the rights
protected by the Bill of Rights could not, realistically, be applied in absolute terms;
a balancing of individual interests against the collective needs of society was
necessary....
However, the presence of s. 1 in our Charterdictates a different approach.... [I]t
seems to me that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Chartermust, before any
application of the limiting part of s. 1, be interpreted in an absolute sense that does
not involve the application of any judicially-created criterion designed to limit the
scope of judicial review. It is only when the limiting part of s. 1 is invoked and
applied that any issue of balancing of individual interests against those of the
collectivity, or any other such judicially-created limiting device, comes into play. If
it were otherwise, that is, if the guaranteed rights were themselves relative in their
content, s. 1 would be redundant. Moreover, the framers of the Charterhaving taken
the care in s. 1 to articulate the grounds on which the guaranteed rights and
freedoms may lawfully be limited, it would be presumptuous for Canadian judges to
develop other grounds on which those rights and freedoms might be limited.

Notwithstanding this statement, McDonald J. appears to have balanced values (the inmate's
interest in privacy and visiting rights against the institution's interest in security) when he
determined that the institution did not limit the inmate's s. 12 right not to be subjected to cruel
and unusual punishment. See 671-73. Having determined that there was no limit on the right,
McDonald J. did not proceed to a s. 1 analysis. Query whether this is consistent with the
position stated in the quoted passage on the ground that the right in s. 12 is not absolute. Or
does consistency with the stated position require the holding that the institution limited the
right, and a s. 1 analysis to balance values?
See also P. Anisman, "Application of the Charter. A Structural Approach" in P. Anisman
and A.M. Linden, eds., The Medi, the Courts and the Charter (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) 1 at
12-19; P.A. Bender, "Justifications for Limiting Constitutionally Guaranteed Rights and
Freedoms: Some Remarks about the Proper Role of Section One of the Canadian Charter"
(1983) 13 Manitoba LJ. 669 at 673, 676, 678.
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There are, then, two techniques judges may use when
defining the rights and freedoms, and balancing the values
underlying the rights and freedoms against other values. One
technique uses both definitional balancing and balancing under
section 1. It begins with the purposive approach to definition.
Judges, applying the purposive approach, define a right or freedom
(for example, freedom of expression) by determining that its
purpose is to protect some values (participation in the democratic
process), but not others which it may conceivably protect (the
efficient working of the commercial market place). On this basis,
judges adopt a definition that is not as broad as it might be, for
example, a definition of freedom of expression that includes political
but not commercial expression. By adopting a narrow definition,
judges reduce the range of cases in which they will find that an
enactment limits a right or freedom, and so they reduce the range
of cases in which they must undertake a section 1 analysis. For
example, having defined freedom of expression as indicated, judges
will hold that an enactment prohibiting political expression limits
freedom of expression, and they will undertake a section 1 analysis
to balance values in order to determine whether the limit is valid.
However, on the basis of this definition, judges will hold that
legislation prohibiting commercial expression does not limit freedom
of expression; because there is no limit, the legislation is valid and
the judges will not proceed to a section 1 analysis. Thus, in our
example, judges considering legislation prohibiting commercial
expression, balance values in the process of defining the scope of
the freedom without resort to section 1. It is only when considering
legislation prohibiting political expression that they balance values
under section 1.
The second technique is applicable only to the rights that
are stated in the Charter in unqualified terms and to the
fundamental freedoms. It draws a sharp distinction between the
process of defining and the process of balancing. Under this
technique judges define as absolutes the unqualified rights and the
freedoms. Therefore, the definitional process does not include
balancing values, except in the sense that a general preference is
given to values underlying these rights and the freedoms. Because
the definitions are broad, judges will more frequently find that
legislative provisions limit these rights and the freedoms and,
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therefore, will more frequently proceed to the section 1 analysis to
balance competing values. Balancing will take place entirely under
section 1. This technique does not fit well with the purposive
approach to definition because defining the unqualified rights and
the freedoms as absolutes does away with the need for an inquiry
into purpose. However, this technique gives full effect to section 1
of the Charter.
In both definitional balancing and balancing under section 1,
judges balance the values underlying rights and freedoms against
competing values legislatures seek to pursue. Nevertheless, there
are differences between the two types of balancing. The work of
Thomas I. Emerson on the legal doctrine developed by u.s. judges
in freedom of speech decisions, sheds some light on these
63
differences.
When judges use definitional balancing they develop general
rules of law defining the scope of the rights and freedoms. When
judges balance under section 1, they are doing what Emerson calls
ad hoc balancing. 64 They do not state a general rule of law, but
rather decide whether the particular limit contained in the particular
enactment under review is reasonable and demonstrably justified in
the particular circumstances of the case. Assume, for example, that
justices of the Supreme Court of Canada consider the issue that
arose in Klein,65 and hold that the Law Society rule restricting price
advertising by lawyers is valid. Using definitional balancing, the
justices state the rule that the protection afforded by the guarantee
of freedom of expression does not extend to commercial expression.

63Supra, note 50 at 53-62. Professor Emerson discussed definitional balancing in the
context of the "absolute" test for freedom of speech. The test directs judges to define freedom
of speech and to give absolute protection to the freedom as defined. Professor Emerson
prefers definitional balancing to ad hoc balancing because in his view (1) judges using
definitional balancing balance values less extensively than judges using ad hoc balancing; (2)

judges using definitional balancing perform a judicial function (defining language and developing
rules of law) which may be distinguished from the legislative function (balancing values), and

(3) definitional balancing in the context of the "absolute" test recognizes that the Bill of Rights
itself strikes a balance of values, and gives more protection to First Amendment freedoms than
does ad hoc balancing.
Professor Emerson recommended that judges deciding First
Amendment cases use only definitional balancing.

64bid. at 53-56.
65

Supra, note 53. See also note 54.
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Alternatively, defining freedom of expression as an absolute and
balancing under section 1, the justices determine that the particular
Law Society rule is reasonable and demonstrably justified in the
circumstances of the case. The decision based on section 1
balancing is ad hoc in the sense that it is unique to the particular
limit in the particular circumstances considered by the justices. It
does not lay down a general rule of law about the degree of
protection afforded to commercial expression, nor even, perhaps,
about the validity in general of rules restricting price advertising by
lawyers.
Another difference between definitional balancing and
balancing under section 1 relates to the level of abstraction at which
the balancing takes place. Under definitional balancing judges
balance values at a high level of abstraction; in the Klein example,
they consider whether the values underlying commercial expression
of all sorts ought to be protected against all other values which
legislatures may pursue in legislation. In ad hoc balancing under
section 1, judges balance the values that arise in the circumstances
of individual cases. In the Klein example, they consider whether the
values underlying unrestricted advertising by lawyers (commercial
expression, competition, informed choice by consumers) are to be
preferred to the values underlying the regulation under
consideration (professionalism).
What are the implications of the introduction of definitional
balancing through the Supreme Court's adoption of the purposive
approach? It is arguable that when justices of the Supreme Court
use definitional balancing they have more influence on decision
making by lower court judges than they have when they balance
under section 1. The end result of definitional balancing is the
creation of rules of law to which lower court judges (and officials
other than judges) may look in later cases. If the justices of the
Supreme Court decide that freedom of expression does not include
commercial expression, lower court judges should hold, thereafter,
that legislation prohibiting or regulating commercial expression may
not be challenged under the Charter. On the other hand, the end
result of balancing under section 1 is not a rule of law, but an ad
hoc decision which arguably does not provide guidance for judges in
later cases. If justices of the Supreme Court hold that the Law
Society rule in Klein, although a limit on freedom of expression, is
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valid under section 1, lower court judges in a later case dealing with
a somewhat different regulation of price advertising by lawyers, may
hold that the particular regulation before them, in the circumstances
before them, is not within section 1 and is therefore invalid.
This reasoning is not entirely convincing. First, it appears to
give too much weight to the importance of rules and too little
weight to the importance of values and perceptions of the judicial
role in Charteradjudication. As judges decide more cases under the
Charter, they will state an increasingly large number of rules in the
course of definitional balancing. Lower court judges will have
freedom to determine which rule applies in a particular case;
further, in the course of applying the rule they select, lower court
judges may reshape it, sometimes expanding it and sometimes
restricting it in order to give effect to their value choices.
Therefore, the decisions of lower court judges will not be tightly
controlled by the rules of law stated by Supreme Court judges in
the course of definitional balancing. For example, a lower court
judge may side-step a Supreme Court holding that commercial
expression is not protected by ruling that a legislative provision that
appears to limit commercial expression actually limits a type of
expression that is protected. In Klein itself, Henry J. suggested that
price advertising is a form of political expression.6 Secondly, the
reasoning seems to give too little weight to the use that lower court
judges may make of Supreme Court decisions based on ad hoc
balancing if they wish to do so. Judges may look beyond the
particulars of a decision based on section 1 and induce general
statements about the importance of the government's purposes, the
suitability of the means used, and the severity of the effects of the
limit on the rights and freedoms. 67 They may use these general
statements to guide them in their decisions. In short, lower court
judges may derive guidance inductively from Supreme Court
decisions based on section 1 balancing, just as they may derive
guidance deductively from decisions based on definitional balancing.
As a second implication of definitional balancing, it is
arguable that parties relying on the Charterwill be more successful
66Supra, note 53 at 506.
67See, infra, text at notes 159, 182 and 191.
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if judges balance values only under section 1 than they will be if
judges use definitional balancing. This argument is based on the
view that the rules governing the onus of proof give the party
relying on the Charteran advantage when judges balance only under
section 1. The rules probably68 impose the onus at the definitional
stage of the analysis on the party relying on the Charter, the rules
clearly impose the onus in the section 1 analysis on the party
seeking to uphold a limit. 69
When judges balance only under section 1, the party relying
on the Charter has a strategic advantage. The judges begin by
assuming that they should define the unqualified rights and the
freedoms as absolutes. Therefore, there is little argument at the
definitional stage of the analysis; the party relying on the Charter,
who has the onus of proof at this stage of the analysis, may
discharge the onus easily. The judges then move to section 1 to
balance values. The major part of the argument takes place in the
section 1 analysis, where the onus is on the party seeking to uphold
the limit.
On the other hand, when judges use the purposive approach
and definitional balancing, the party relying on the Charter is at a
strategic disadvantage. A major part of the analysis occurs when the
judges define the rights and freedoms because they define and
balance at the same time. At this definitional stage, the party
seeking Charter protection likely bears the onus of proof. As this
party must persuade the judges to adopt a broad definition of the
rights and freedoms, the onus is not easily discharged. If this party
fails to discharge the onus, the judges define the rights and
freedoms narrowly, hold that the enactment does not impose a limit
and do not proceed to the section 1 analysis; that is, they do not
proceed to the part of the analysis in which the party seeking to
uphold the limit bears the onus.
On this argument, then, the strategic disadvantage suffered
by the party relying on the Charter if judges use definitional
68The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet explicitly stated which party has the onus of
proof at the definitional stage of Charter analysis. If an enactment is presumed to be
constitutional at this stage of the analysis, the party relying on the Charterbears the onus of

proof.
69

See infra, text at note 129. See also Anisman, supra, note 62 at 13-14.
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balancing will lead judges to give less protection to the unqualified
rights and the freedoms than they will do if they balance only under
section 1. This assessment of the different results likely to flow
from the two approaches to definition and balancing is not
persuasive. It assumes that technical legal considerations - the rules
governing the onus of proof - are likely to be more influential in
Charter litigation than the judges' assessments of the policy issues
and of the desirability of activism or restraint. If one holds the view
that the latter two factors are more significant than the former, one
will conclude that judges motivated by those two factors will
manipulate the technical, legal considerations in a way that will
achieve the results they desire.
I have argued that the Supreme Court's adoption of the
purposive approach to definition has implications not only for the
process of defining rights and freedoms but also for the process of
balancing values. The justices of the Supreme Court did not, in Big
M, explicitly recognize or discuss the impact of the purposive
approach on the process of balancing values. In Oakes, Dickson ci.
stressed that section 1 is the sole criterion for limiting the rights and
freedoms (other than section 33).70 It is precisely this feature of
section 1 that suggests that the unqualified rights and the freedoms
should be defined as absolutes. If they are defined as less than
absolute they are limited without reference to section 1. In Oakes,
too, Dickson ci. stated that the two stages of Charter analysis (first,
determining whether an enactment limits a right or freedom and,
second, determining whether the limit is within section 1) are to be
kept separate. 71 However, if the unqualified rights and the
freedoms are defined as less than absolute, the process of defining
them in the first stage of the analysis includes balancing values,
which is the major judicial task in the second stage of the analysis.
Further, as the qualified rights may not be defined as absolutes, the
process of defining them also includes balancing values. For these
reasons, the two stages of Charter analysis are not separate and
distinct.

70

Supra, note 2 at 224-25.

71

Supra, note 7.
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B. Assessing a Legislative Provision
1. Purposes and effects
After judges define the right or freedom at issue in a case,
they must assess the challenged legislative provision to determine
whether it imposes a limit on the right or freedom as the latter has
been defined. In this assessment, judges consider the purposes and
effects of the legislative provision. The provision limits the right or
freedom if (a) one of the legislature's purposes when it enacted the
provision was to limit the right or freedom, or (b) an effect of the
provision is to limit the right or freedom even if the legislature's
purpose was not to limit. If judges determine that the legislative
provision limits a right or freedom, they proceed to the section 1
analysis to consider whether the limit comes within section 1. An
exception to this last statement is the case of a limit of the sort that
72
may not come within section 1, and this is discussed below.
In developing this position in Big M, Dickson ci. rejected
the argument that judges should look only to the effects of a
provision to determine whether the provision violates a right or
freedom. 73 He summarized his position as follows:
In short, I agree with the respondent that the legislation's purpose is the initial test

of constitutional validity and its effects are to be considered when the law under
review has passed or, at least, has purportedly passed the purpose test. If the
legislation fails the purpose test, there is no need to consider further its effects,
since it has already been demonstrated to be invalid. Thus, if a law with a valid
purpose interferes by its impact, with rights or freedoms, a litigant could still argue
the effects of the legislation as a means to defeat its applicability and possibly its
validity. In short, the effects test will only be necessary to defeat legislation with a
valid pu pse; effects can never be relied upon to save legislation with an invalid
purpose.

72Infra, text at notes 99-119.
73

Supra, note 1 at 350-52. In this passage, Dickson CJ.spoke of purpose in the singular
form and of effect in both the singular and plural forms. In the text, I attempt to use forms
of these words which indicate that judges may identify more than one purpose and effect for
an enactment.
74

1bid. at 351-52.
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Justice Wilson, speaking for herself in separate reasons
devoted largely to this issue, adopted a different position. She
rejected the importance of purpose at this stage of the analysis, and
reasoned that the sole question is whether the legislation "has the
effect of violating an entrenched right or freedom." 75 She reasoned
that "so long as a statute has such an actual or potential effect on
it does not matter what the purpose behind the
an entrenched right,
76
enactment was."
In Big M, the Chief Justice did not discuss in detail the sort
of investigation judges must undertake to identify the purposes and
effects of a legislative provision, or to determine whether a purpose
or an effect is to limit a right or freedom. He did point out that
"[P]urpose and effect ... are clearly linked," and that "intended and
actual effects have often been looked to for guidance in assessing
the legislation's object and thus, its validity."T7 Further, he held that
the relevant purpose is the purpose intended by the enacting
legislature at the time of the enactment. He rejected the argument
that Canadian judges should follow the view of some judges in the
United States that the purposes of legislation may "shift, or be
transformed over time by changing social conditions."7 8 It is true
that if judges consider not the enacting legislature's purposes for

71bid. at 372.
76
1bid. at 373. On a technical analysis there may not be much difference in the application
of the two tests. This may be seen if one assumes that a single judge applies both tests. If the
judge holds under the Chief Justice's test that a purpose of the enactment is not to limit a right
or freedom, the judge must consider the effects of the provision just as he or she must do when
applying Justice Wilson's test. Therefore, in this case the two tests yield the same result. If
the judge holds under the Chief Justice's test that a purpose of the provision is to limit a right
or freedom, he or she may nevertheless hold under Justice Wilson's test that the provision
does not affect a right or freedom. In this case the two tests yield different results. These
holdings are unlikely, however, as one of the effects of a provision is to achieve its purposes
if the provision is reasonably well drafted. As the Chief Justice observed in Big M at 351, it is
"difficult to conceive of legislation with an unconstitutional purpose, where the effects would
not also be unconstitutional." Nevertheless, in Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen (1963),
[1963] S.C.R. 651 at 656-58, 41 D.LR. (2d) 485 at 493-94 [hereinafter Robertson and Rosetanni
cited to D.L.R.], Ritchie J. held that s. 4 of the Lord's Day Act was enacted for a religious
purpose but did not affect freedom of religion. However, Justice Ritchie's holding as to
purpose was in the context of the division of legislative authority under ss 91 and 92 of the
Constitution Act, 1867 (U.K.), 30 and 31 Vict., c. 3. See also Anisman, supra, note 62 at 29-30.

77Big M, ibid. at 350.
78

1bid. at 352-53. See also 348.
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enacting the provision, but the current legislature's purposes for not
repealing it, there is uncertainty in the sense that a law held at one
time to be valid may be held at a later time to be invalid on the
basis of "a revised judicial assessment of purpose."79 On the other
hand, judges who reject the validity of a provision on the basis of
the enacting legislature's purposes, may, if the legislature
immediately re-enacts the provision, be required to reconsider the
matter on the basis of the current legislature's purposes. Professor
Hans A. Linde commented that "In practice, court and counsel want
to debate whether the law is constitutional now, not when it was
enacted."80
At this stage of Charter analysis, judges are not required to
characterize the purposes and effects of the challenged enactment
fully, but only to the extent necessary to determine whether a
purpose or an effect of the enactment is to limit a right or freedom.
For example, judges may hold that one purpose of the provision is
to limit a right or freedom without determining what other purposes
the provision has, or what effects it has on the right or freedom. If
they determine that the provision does limit a right or freedom, they
proceed to section 1; in the section 1 analysis they undertake a
more complete examination in which they identify and assess all the
purposes of the enactment and all the effects of the enactment on
the right or freedom.81 Although the judges' consideration of
purposes and effects is limited at this stage of the analysis, it is
indeterminate.
When I discuss the section 1 analysis,82 I argue that as the
process of identifying purpose is complex and indeterminate, judges
79

Ibid. at 352.

80

HA Linde, "Due Process of Lawmaking" (1976) 55 Nebraska L.R. 197 at 217. Professor

Linde suggested at 222 that the underlying question is whether courts should "review the
one-time reasonableness of lawmakers or the continuing reasonableness of laws."
81

1n the s. 1 analysis, judges must identify the purposes of the provision so that they may

determine whether the purposes are consistent with the principles of a free and democratic
society and "sufficiently important" to warrant a limit; they must identify the effects of the
provision on the right or freedom so that they may determine whether the means used are the
least restrictive means, and so that they may balance the severity of the effects against the
importance of the purposes. See, generally, the discussion of the s. 1 analysis, infra.
82Infra, text at notes 163-69.
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have considerable leeway in their decision making. Judges may look
to a number of different sources to determine purpose, and these
sources may suggest not a single purpose but a number of possible
purposes. Judges may select one or more of these purposes, state
those selected in broad or narrow terms, characterize some as
"important" or "primary," and reject others as "unimportant." In Big
M, for example, the Chief Justice identified two purposes for section
4 of the Lord's Day Act:83 "securing public observance" of the
Christian Sabbath, and "providing a uniform day of rest from
labour,"s4 and he characterized the first purpose as primary.85 The
decision suggests that if the primary purpose of an enactment is to
limit a right or freedom, the enactment limits even if there is a
secondary purpose. It leaves open the question whether the
enactment limits a right or freedom if the primary purpose is to do
something other than limit and the secondary purpose is to limit.
The secondary purpose may be to impose a limit in the sense that
the legislature was prepared8 6to limit a right or freedom in order to
achieve its primary purpose.
As the process of identifying purpose is indeterminate, it
does not point to a single answer to the question whether a purpose
of a legislative provision is to limit a right or freedom. Since judges
are free to select one purpose rather than another, they are free to
conclude that the provision does or does not impose a limit. In the
absence of clear rules to determine whether a purpose of an
enactment is to impose a limit, judges may engage in result-oriented
decision making; they may manipulate the analysis in order to justify
the result they wish to achieve on the basis of their policy
preferences and their perceptions of the appropriate judicial role in

83Supra, note 17.

84Supra, note 1 at 338.
85

1bid. at 353 and 366.

86
1n Big M the secondary purpose was ultra vires the federal Parliament. The Chief Justice
did not determine whether government may rely on an ultra vires purpose at the first stage of
the Charter analysis. However, he held at 366-67 (and Wilson J. agreed at 373) that government
may not rely on an ultra vires purpose in the s. 1 analysis. There is little reason to allow
government to rely on an ultra vires purpose at the first stage of the analysis if it may not rely
on the purpose in the s. 1 analysis. See, infra, text at notes 117-19.
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constitutional adjudication. Some may hold that a purpose of the
enactment is to limit a right or freedom; these judges go on to the
section 1 analysis. Others may hold that it is not a purpose of the
enactment to impose a limit; these judges go on to consider whether
an effect of the enactment is to impose a limit.
The process of identifying the effects of a legislative
provision is also complex and indeterminate. As indicated above, at
this stage of the analysis judges need not undertake a full
consideration of the effects of the provision. They need only
determine whether the provision has an effect on a right or
freedom, that is, whether it "interferes by its impact with, 8 7 a right
or freedom. However, even the limited inquiry which must be
undertaken to reach this determination is not a simple one.
First, judges may agree on the impact a legislative provision
has, and disagree on the question whether the provision affects a
right or freedom. In Robertson v. Rosetanni,88 judges who agreed
that the impact of section 4 of the Lord's Day Act is to prohibit all
persons, regardless of religious affiliation if any, from carrying on
business on Sunday, nevertheless disagreed on the question whether
the section has an effect on freedom of religion. Ritchie J. held
that the section does not affect freedom of religion, but has only a
secular and financial effect s 9 Cartwright J., dissenting, held that the
section does affect freedom of religion.m°
Second, a legislative provision may have a number of effects.
Judges may characterize one of these effects as "an important"
effect, the "primary" effect or the "sole" effect. A judge who
stresses the importance of an effect that is not related to a right or
freedom is less likely to hold that a provision limits a right or
freedom than a judge who stresses the importance of an effect that
is related to a right or freedom.

87Supra, note 1 at 352.
88Supra, note 76.
89

1bid. at 494.

90bid. at 488-89.
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Third, as the jurisprudence develops, the justices of the
Supreme Court will have to decide whether the rule should be that
a provision imposes a limit if it has the slightest effect on a right or
freedom or only if it has a substantial effect on a right or freedom.
A slightest effect test may appear to give more protection to the
rights and freedoms, but may lead to holdings that appear trivial or
fanciful. For example, on the slightest effect test, a justice may hold
that income tax, labour relations, and town planning legislation limit
freedom of the press 1 Further, a slightest effect test is wasteful
because it puts litigants to the expense of preparing a section 1
analysis in cases where judges are almost certain to hold that the
limit is justified under section 1. Judges are more likely to hold
that a limit comes within section 1 if they characterize it as having
only a slight effect on a right or freedom, than if they characterize
it as having a substantial effect 2
To avoid these difficulties the justices of the Supreme Court
may refine the effects test to provide that a provision limits a right
or freedom only if it has a substantial effect on the right or
freedom. If the doctrine develops in this way, the determination
whether an effect is substantial or not will be another point in the
analysis at which judges may disagree. In the absence of clear rules
to determine what is a substantial effect, judges may engage in
result-oriented decision making by manipulating the doctrine to
justify choices determined not by the doctrine but by their policy
preferences and their views about the desirability of judicial activism
or restraint.
It will be difficult if not impossible to develop determinate
rules to determine whether an effect is substantial. The doctrine
might distinguish between direct and indirect effects, and provide
that an effect is substantial only if it is direct. This is not
satisfactory because direct effects may be trivial, and indirect effects
severe. Further, judges may not agree whether an effect is direct or
indirect. Indeed, judges may not agree whether an enactment
affects a right or freedom indirectly or not at all. In Robertson and
91

This sort of legislation may have an effect on the financial position of newspaper

publishers.

92See infra, text at notes 191-204.
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Rosetanni, Ritchie J. expressed the view that the Lord's Day Act
affects only secular and financial interests by saying that the Act
does not affect freedom of religion at all. 9- In Braunfeld v. Brown,
Chief Justice Earl Warren of the United States Supreme Court
expressed a similar view by saying that the Sunday law he was
considering "imposes only an indirect burden on the exercise of
religion," that is, affects freedom of religion indirectly. 94 If the
doctrine requires judges to make these distinctions, the result is
likely to be an increase, not a decrease, in the opportunity for
result-oriented decision making.
I shall note briefly two other features of a substantial effect
test. First, it is arguable that a substantial effect test will give the
justices of the Supreme Court more control over decision making by
lower court judges than a slightest effect test. This argument rests
on the view that when the justices of the Supreme Court apply a
substantial effect test and hold that an enactment which has a slight
effect on a right or freedom does not impose a limit, they state a
rule of law about the enactment that is "binding" on lower court
judges. On the other hand, when they apply a slightest effect test
and hold that an enactment which has a slight effect on a right or
freedom imposes a limit, but that the limit is within section 1
because the slight effect is outweighed by the importance of the
legislative purposes, their decision is ad hoc and has little value as
a precedent. This argument is similar to one I discuss with respect
to definitional balancing, 95 and is not persuasive for the reasons I
give when I discuss definitional balancing.
Second, when judges consider whether the effect of an
enactment is substantial, they are dealing with a factor that is also
an element of the section 1 analysis. In that analysis, judges must
balance the "severity" of the effects of a limit of a right or freedom
against the importance of the purposes the legislature seeks to

93

Supra, text at note 89.

94(1961), 366 U.S. 599 at 606.
95Supra, text at notes 64-67.
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achieve by imposing the limit.96 As "substantiality" and "severity" are
the same in this context, the process of determining whether an
enactment limits a right or freedom encompasses an element of the
balancing of values that takes place under section 1. Therefore, this
process, like the process of definitional balancing, is a point at
which the two stages of Charter analysis overlap.9 7 Indeed, quite
apart from the element of balancing in the substantial effect test,
the two stages of analysis overlap in the sense that judges must
consider the purposes and effects of an impugned enactment to
determine both whether the enactment imposes a limit and whether
the limit comes within section 1.
An example will, perhaps, illustrate the wide range of
options open to judges when they consider the purposes and effects
of a legislative provision in order to determine whether the
provision limits a right or freedom.
A municipal by-law prohibits the sale of goods on the street.
By way of example, the by-law lists a number of street vending
operations that are prohibited, including the sale of newspapers
from vending boxes.
(a) Justice A holds that the municipal council's primary
purpose in the part of the by-law referring to newspaper vending
boxes was to limit freedom of the press. Justice B holds that the
council's primary purpose was not to limit freedom of the press, but
its secondary purpose was to do so in the sense that it was prepared
to limit the freedom in order to attain its other purposes. Both A
and B hold on the basis of the purpose test alone that the by-law
imposes a limit. Both proceed to the section 1 analysis.
(b) Justice C agrees with B that the municipal council's
secondary purpose was to limit freedom of the press. C holds that
as this is not an important purpose of the by-law, the by-law does
not impose a limit by reason of its purposes. C goes on to consider
the effects of the enactment.
(c) Justices D, E, F, and G hold that the municipal council's
purposes were to ensure the free flow of traffic on the streets, to
protect the livelihood of store owners, and to maintain the aesthetic
96

See infra, text at notes 191-204.

97

See supra, text at note 71 and, infra, text at note 195.
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qualities of the streets. These judges reject the argument that one
of the council's purposes was to limit freedom of the press. They
go on to consider the effects of the enactment.
(d) Justice C holds that the by-law has a direct, and
therefore a substantial, effect on freedom of the press because it
prohibits a means of distributing newspapers. Justice D holds that
the effect on freedom of the press, although indirect because it does
not prohibit the publication of any statement, is substantial because
distribution through street vending boxes is less costly than other
means of distribution (which may require subscription lists and home
delivery), and therefore may be critical to the survival of some
newspapers. Justice E accepts D's view that the effect on freedom
of the press is indirect, but not D's view that the effect is
substantial; E holds that the effect is slight both because it is
indirect and because publishers may use other means to distribute
newspapers. However, E applies the slightest effect test and
concludes that the enactment limits the freedom. Thus, although
each of these three judges applies the effect test differently, each
holds that the provision
limits freedom of the press, and proceeds to
98
the section 1 analysis.
(e) Justice F agrees with E that the effect on freedom of
the press is both indirect and slight. However, F applies the
substantial effect test and concludes that the by-law does not limit
the freedom. Justice G holds that the enactment has no effect on
the freedom, because it does not prohibit the press from publishing
any statement. Although F and G disagree about the effect the
enactment has on the freedom, they agree that the enactment does
not limit the freedom. Accordingly, they dismiss the claim for a
remedy under the Charter without a section 1 analysis.

98
Since E holds that the effect on freedom of the press is slight, E is perhaps more likely
than C or D to hold in the s. 1 analysis that the limit comes within s. 1 on the ground that the
importance of the legislative purposes outweighs the severity of the effect of the limit on the
freedom. See infra, text at notes 191-204.
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2. Exceptional limits that may not come within section 1
The justices of the Supreme Court suggested inA.G. Quebec
v. Quebec Association of Protestant School Boards that some limits
are of a sort that may not come within section 1, and that judges
may invalidate these limits without reference to section 1.99 This is
a departure from the usual rule that an enactment that limits a right
or freedom is valid if the limit meets the requirements of section 1.
Professor Peter Hogg, in his treatise, following the language used by
Desch6nes ci., the trial judge in the School Boards decision,
referred to these exceptional limits as "denials" of a right or
freedom! °°
The reasons given in the School Boards decision do not
clearly indicate how judges are to distinguish between a legislative
provision that imposes a limit that may come within section 1, and
a provision that imposes a limit that may not come within section 1.
The notion of the limit that may not come within section 1 is,
therefore, an indeterminate element in Charter analysis. Judges
have freedom to disagree on the characterization of a limit as one
that may or may not come within section 1 and, therefore, freedom
to manipulate this distinction in order to achieve goals suggested by
policy preferences and perceptions of the appropriate judicial role
in constitutional adjudication under the Charter.
In the School Boards decision, the justices of the Supreme
Court held that provisions of the Quebec Charter of the French
Language, known as Bill 101,101 setting out the conditions under
which a child may be educated in English in Quebec, are
inconsistent with section 23 of the Charter which sets out broader
conditions under which a child may receive an education in either
English or French anywhere in Canada. The justices gave two
reasons to support the decision to invalidate the limit contained in
the Quebec enactment without considering section 1. These reasons
99(1984), [1984] 2 S.C.R. 66 at 84 and 88, 10 D.L.R (4th) 321 at 336 and 338 [hereinafter
School Boards cited to D.L.R-].
100P.w. Hogg, ConstitutionalLaw of Canada,2d ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) at 682-84.
101

RS.Q. 1977, c. C-11, chap. VIII, ss 72 and 73.
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suggest possible rules for identifying a limit that may not come
within section 1. The first reason turns on the purposes of section
23 of the Charter and of the Quebec enactment; the second turns
on the effect of the Quebec enactment. A consideration of the two
reasons suggests that in view of the more sophisticated doctrine
developed in Big M and Oakes there is little reason for the Court to
retain the concept of the limit that may not come within section 1.
First, the justices held that the framers of the Charter
included section 23 specifically for the purpose of invalidating the
provisions of Bill 101 (which were in force at the time the Charter
was adopted).102 Therefore, the justices reasoned, the framers of
the Charter cannot have regarded the provisions of Bill 101 as
coming within section 1.103 This reasoning suggests the following
rule: a limit of a right or freedom is a limit of the sort that may
not come within section 1 if the framers of the Charterintended the
guarantee of the right or freedom to invalidate the enactment
containing the limit.
This rule appears to be one that encourages judicial activism
as it enables judges to invalidate a limit without undertaking a
section 1 analysis. However, as judges may readily disagree about
the intentions of the framers," it is a rule that judges may
circumvent if they wish to do so. Although judges who engage in
judicial activism may invoke the rule, judges who wish to defer to
legislatures may avoid the rule by holding that the section containing
the right or freedom limited by an impugned enactment was not
included in the Charter specifically for the purpose of invalidating
the enactment. For example, some but not all judges may hold that
the framers of the Charter adopted the wording of section 15(1)
specifically for the purpose of invalidating the sections of the Indian
102

Supra, note 99 at 331-35.

103

1bid. at 335-36. However, it is arguable that if the framers intended to exclude the
operation of s. 1, they would have said so explicitly. Cf. s. 28 of the Charter.
1041n the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, supra, note 9 at 508-09, Lamer J. stated that "the
intention of the legislative bodies which adopted the Charter" is "a fact which is nearly
impossible of proof." See also, supra, text at notes 37-38.
In School Boards, ibid. at 331-35, the justices based their holding that the framers
intended s. 23 to invalidate Bill 101 on a consideration of the history of language of instruction
legislation in Quebec, and a comparison of the terms of the two enactments.
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Act and the Unemployment Insurance Act which were held to be

valid in decisions 0 s applying the Canadian Bill of Rights.
The justices' second reason for holding that Bill 101 imposes
on the section 23 right a limit that is invalid without reference to
section 1, focused on the effects of Bill 101. The justices held that
"the real effect" of Bill 101 "is to make an exception to" section 23
of the sort contemplated by section 33 of the Charter, that Bill 101
"directly alters the effect of section 23 ...
without following the

procedure laid down for amending the Constitution"; that there is
"direct conflict" between Bill 101 and section 23, and that the two
"collide directly."1°6 The justices summarized their reasons in their
conclusion on this point:
The provisions of s. 73 of Bill 101 collide directly with those of s. 23 of the Charter,
and are not limits which can be legitimized by s. 1 of the Charter. Such limits cannot
be exceptions to the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter nor amount to
amendments of the Charter. An Act of Parliament or of a legislature which, for
example, purported to impose the beliefs of a State religion would be in direct
conflict with s.2(a) of the Charter, which guarantees freedom of conscience and
religion, and would have to be ruled of no force or effect without the necessity of
even considering whether such legislation could be legitimized by, 7 1. The same
applies to chap. VIII of Bill 101 in respect of s. 23 of the Charter.

This reasoning suggests the following rule: a limit on
or freedom will be ruled invalid without reference to section
effects are in direct conflict with the right or freedom so
amounts to an exception of the sort that may be made
section 33 or by amendment of the Charter.

a right
1 if its
that it
under

105A.G. Canada v. Lavell (1973), [1974] S.C.R. 1349, 38 D.LR. (3d) 481; Bliss v. A.G.
Canada (1978), [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, 92 D.LR. (3d) 417. See W.S. Tarnopolsky, "The Equality
Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1983) 61 Can. Bar Rev. 242 at
248-50.
Although s. 24(2) of the Charterdoes not guarantee a right or freedom, judges may
hold that it was included in the Charter specifically to overturn the common law rule that all
relevant evidence, however obtained, is admissible in criminal proceedings.
Judges may apply the rule being discussed not only to enactments existing in 1982
which they hold the framers wished to invalidate, but also to future enactments similar in
content to those enactments.
106Supra, note 99 at 337-38.
107

1bid. at 338. The justices did not hold that a limit of the sort that may not come within

s. 1 must take away the whole of a right or freedom. Bill 101 itself did not take away the whole
of the s. 23 right to educate children in English in Quebec. See also the justices' treatment at
327, 331 and 336 of the decision of Beauregard J. of the Quebec Court of Appeal.
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The justices' holding appears to be that a limit that may not
come within section 1 is unlike a limit that may come within section
1 (and like an amendment, or an exception enacted pursuant to
section 33) because its effect is in direct conflict with a Charterright
or freedom. When this issue arises in the future justices may hold
that this reasoning has been overtaken by the reasoning developed
in Big M and Oakes. The decision in Big M indicates that an
enactment that has an effect on a right or freedom is a limit. This
includes an enactment that has a direct effect on (or "collides
directly" with) a right or freedom. An enactment that has a direct
effect on a right or freedom is likely to be more severe than one
that has an indirect effect. However, the directness of the effect
and the consequent severity of the limit is not a reason to hold that
the limit is of a sort that may not come within section 1.108 The
decision in Oakes indicates 1°9 that the severity of the effect is a
factor to be balanced against the importance of the legislative
purposes to determine if the limit comes within section 1.110
In Big M, both Dickson c.J" and Wilson j.1 2 referred to
the School Boards decision. However, neither justice suggested that
section 4 of the Lord's Day Act imposes a limit on freedom of
conscience and religion that may be invalidated without considering
section 1. Both justices held that section 4 of the Lord's Day Act
limits freedom of conscience and religion,113 and that the limit does
114 The Chief Justice
not come within section 1 of the Charter.
identified two legislative purposes for the enactment: securing

108

Supra, text at notes 72-80 and 87-97. Legislation prohibiting obscenity has a direct effect

on freedom of expression in the sense that it directly prohibits the publication of certain
statements. Such legislation may, nevertheless, be upheld under s. 1.
1

09&nfra, text at notes 191-204.

11 0

Cf Hogg, supra, note 100 at 684.

11 1

Supra, note 1 at 351.

1 12

1bid. at 372 and 374.

1 13

1bid. at 365 and 369.

1141bid. at 367 and 369.
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observance of the Christian Sabbath, and providing a uniform day of
rest from labour;115 and he held that the religious purpose is the
primary purpose.1 1 6 Both justices held1 17 that the government could
not rely on the secular purpose because the Supreme Court had
never in the past found it to be the purpose of the legislation, and
because it is an ultra vires purpose in the context of the
constitutional division of legislative authority. Therefore, in the
section 1 analysis, the government could rely only on the religious
purpose, that is, on its intention to abridge freedom of religion. As
a result the government failed in the section 1 analysis. To succeed
in the section 1 analysis, government must show that one of its
purposes is a purpose that judges may balance against the right or
freedom and find consistent with the principles of a free and
democratic society and "sufficiently important" to warrant the
limit.11 8 Government will not succeed if, as in Big M, the only
purpose on which it may rely is the purpose of limiting the right or
freedom, as this is not a purpose that judges may balance against
the right or freedom and find consistent with these principles and
"sufficiently important." Wilson J. put the point in these words:
Given that the federal government cannot rely on an ultra vires purpose in
attempting to uphold the legislation under s. 1 any attempt to characterize the Lord's
DayAct as a reasonable limit on the Charter right to freedom of religion must fail.
To hold otherwise would be to find that the s. 2(a) right to religious freedom can be
legitimately curtailed where Parliament acts for the purpose of curtailing religious
freedom. Without having to determine at this point the principles upon which an
evaluation of a given government objective and its reasonableness as a limit on a
Charter right will be premised, it is possible to state with certainty that this
governmental objective or interest cannot pass the s. 1 test. Indeed, it was made
clear in Quebec ProtestantSchool Boards, supra, that legislation cannot be regarded
as embodying legitimate limits within the meaning of s. 1 where jpi legislative
purpose is precisely the purpose at which the Charter right is aimed.

115

1bid. at 338.

116

1bid. at 353.

11 7

1bid. at 366-67 and 373.

118See infra, text at notes 159-81.

119 Supra, note 1 at 373-74. This passage from Justice Wilson's reasons suggests an
explanation for the decision in the School Boards case that does not depend on the idea of the

(continued...)
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IlI.
THE SECOND STAGE OF CHARTER ANALYSIS:
DETERMINING WHETHER A LIMIT COMES WITHIN
SECTION 1
Section 1
The Canadian CharterofRights andFreedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set
out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be

demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

A. The Section 1 Standard of Justification
When judges come to the section 1 analysis, they have
already determined that the legislative provision under review
imposes a limit on a Charter right or freedom. (If they hold that
there is no limit, the legislative provision is not inconsistent with
the Charter and the section 1 inquiry is not necessary.) The judges'
task in the section 1 analysis is to determine whether the limit
meets the three requirements of section 1 that it be (i) a reasonable
limit, (ii) that is prescribed by law, and (iii) that can be
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. If the
judges hold that the limit meets these requirements, the legislative
provision is allowed to stand although it limits a right or freedom.
If they determine that the limit does not meet any one of the three
requirements, they
declare that the legislative provision is "of no
12
force or effect. , 1
When judges consider whether a legislative limit on a right
or freedom is salvaged under section 1, they must determine
whether the right or freedom should give way to enable the
legislature to attain the purposes for which it passed the legislation,
119

(...continued)
exceptional limit that may not come within s. 1. If the holding that s. 23 was adopted to
invalidate Bill 101 implies that the purpose of Bill
101 was to infringe s. 23, and if this was the
sole purpose on which the Quebec government relied, then on the basis of the passage quoted
the result of a s. 1 analysis is that the limit is not justified.
120

See the Charter,supra, note 3, s. 52.
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or the legislation should be invalidated to preserve the right or
freedom. In making this determination, judges balance the social
interests or values underlying the right or freedom against the social
interests or values which the legislature sought to promote by
enacting the legislation. The judges' task in the section 1 analysis,
therefore, is to balance the Charter values against the legislative
values, and to determine which should in the circumstances prevail.
In Oakes, which contains the Supreme Court's most
complete treatment of the meaning and application of section 1,
Dickson cJ. recognized that the judicial task in the section 1 analysis
is to balance competing values. He said
The underlying values and principles of a free and democratic society are the genesis
of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter and the ultimate standard
against which a limit on a right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be
reasonable and demonstrably justified.
The rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter are not, however,
absolute. It may become necessary to limit rights and freedoms in circumstances
where their exercise would be inimical to the realization of collective goals of

fundamental importance. For this reason, s. 1 provides criteri
limits on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter....

f justification for

Again, when discussing the proportionality test, he said, "... in each

case courts will be required to balance the interests of society with
122
those of individuals and groups.
In his discussion of the words "free and democratic society,"
the Chief Justice again stressed the importance of an assessment of
values in the section 1 analysis. Further, he used these words to
develop a standard of justification against which to assess a limiting
enactment. These words, he said, refer "the court to the very
purpose for which the Charter was originally entrenched in the
123
Constitution: Canadian society is to be free and democratic."
The "values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society" constitute "the ultimate standard against which a limit on a
right or freedom must be shown, despite its effect, to be reasonable
and demonstrably justified." These values and principles include
respect for human dignity, social justice, equality, diversity of beliefs,
121

Supra, note 2 at 225.

122

Ibid. at 227.

1231bid. at 225.
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cultural and group identity, and the institutions of participatory
democracy.12 4 Thus, the Chief Justice used the words "free and
democratic society" to develop a standard made up of a set of
values and principles against which the values furthered by a limiting
enactment are to be measured and balanced.
The Chief Justice's approach to the words "free and
democratic society" is different from the approach taken by some
lower court judges before the Supreme Court decision in Oakes.
Many lower court judges treated these words not as a source of a
standard of justification which gives values a central place in the
section 1 analysis, but as a direction to use comparative
jurisprudence as a component of the analysis. These judges
canvassed legislation and case law in other jurisdictions to ascertain
whether other free and democratic societies impose limits on the
rights and freedoms that are similar to the limit imposed by the
impugned enactment.
The lower court judges looked most
frequently to the laws of Britain, other Commonwealth countries,
125
and the United States.

A consideration of the standard of justification developed by
the Chief Justice indicates that judges have a great deal of freedom
when they apply the standard to assess a limiting enactment. The
standard is made up of the values and principles essential to a free
and democratic society. As these values and principles are stated in
general terms, judges must define them before they may apply the
124

1bid. at 225. Compare the values and principles listed here with the characteristics of
a free society identified by the Chief Justice in Big M, supra, note 1 at 353.
125

See for example, Re Southam and . (No. 1) (1983), 41 O.RI (2d) 113 at 129-34, 146
D.L.R. (3d) 408 at 424-29 (CA.) [hereinafter Southam cited to D.L.R.]. MacKinnon A.C.J.O.
expressed reservations about the help that Canadian judges may derive from a consideration
of the law of other jurisdictions. He said at 424-25:
In determining whether the limit is justifiable, some help may be derived from
considering the legislative approaches taken in similar fields by other acknowledged
free and democratic societies. Presumably this may also assist in determining whether
the limit is a reasonable one. It may be that some of the rights guaranteed by the
Charterdo not have their counterpart in other free and democratic societies and one
is sent back immediately to the facts of our own society. In any event I believe the
court must come back, ultimately, having derived whatever assistance can be secured
from the experience of other free and democratic societies, to the facts of our own
free and democratic society to answer the question whether the limit imposed on the
particular guaranteed freedom has been demonstrably justified as a reasonable one,
having balanced the perceived purpose and objectives of the limiting legislation, in
light of all relevant considerations, against the freedom or right allegedly infringed.
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standard. In so doing they define the standard itself. Judges who
disagree with one another about the meaning of the values and
principles may disagree about the content of the standard. Further,
as the standard is made up of a number of values and principles,
the judges applying the standard decide which values and principles
to emphasize in a particular case, and so again they may disagree
about the content of the standard. As the judges applying the
standard themselves create it, they may in a particular case fashion
a standard that supports either a decision that a limit conforms to
the standard or a decision that it does not conform to the
Therefore, judges may invoke the standard of
standard.126
justification to justify decisions that are based on their policy
preferences and their views about the desirability of judicial activism
or restraint in constitutional adjudication. This is another point in
Charteranalysis at which doctrine does not control decision making.
The language used by the Chief Justice in Oakes suggests
that in the section 1 analysis judges should not show deference to
the will of legislative majorities, but rather should adopt an activist
stance in order to protect the values underlying the rights and
freedoms. Indications of activism appear in the Chief Justice's
holding that a limit on a right or freedom must meet a "stringent
standard of justification, ''127 in his holding that the government bears
a heavy onus of proof, and in the doctrine he developed for the
analysis of the purposes, means, and effects of an enactment
containing a limit.
The Chief Justice sought to justify the adoption of doctrine
suggestive of judicial activism by reference to the language of
section 1. First, he noted that section 1 "constitutionally guarantees
the rights and freedoms" set out in the Charter. Judges undertake
the section 1 analysis only after they hold that an enactment violates
"rights and freedoms which are part of the supreme law of Canada."
Second, the words "free and democratic society" indicate that the
purpose of the Charter is to ensure that "Canadian Society is to be
126I take essentially the same view of the use of the values and principles of a free and
democratic society as an aid to the definition of the rights and freedoms. See supra, text at
note 29. For discussion of the application of the standard of justification in the s. 1 analysis
see infra, text at notes 178-81; 184 and 190, and 202-203.
1270akes, supra, note 2 at 225.
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principles of a free and democratic society are the ultimate standard
against which a limit" must be justified. On the basis of these two
factors, he concluded that the criteria in section 1 impose "a
stringent standard of justification." Further, because limits on the
rights and freedoms are "exceptions to their general guarantee,"
there is no presumption of constitutionality in favour of legislation
containing a limit. Indeed, "(t)he presumption is that the rights and
freedoms are guaranteed...." This presumption and the words
"demonstrably justified" establish that a limit may not be brought
128
within section 1 easily.
Although the Chief Justice used language that appears to
mandate judicial activism in the section 1 analysis, I shall argue that
the doctrine he developed to govern the section 1 analysis, like the
doctrine developed to govern the first stage of Charter analysis, may
be used by judges to justify either activism or restraint.

B. The Onus of Proof under Section 1
The Chief Justice, in Oakes,129 held that the party seeking to
uphold a limit on a right or freedom has the onus of bringing the
limit within section 1. It is not the criminal onus of proof beyond
a reasonable doubt as that would be "unduly onerous on the party
seeking to limit."1 0 It is the civil onus of proof on a preponderance
of probability, but it is at the high end of the civil onus which
requires "a very high degree of probability."131 It is not an onus of
proof of fact, but an "onus of justification,"132 an onus of
establishing "the constituent elements of a s.1 inquiry,"13 3 that is,
that the limit is a reasonable one that is prescribed by law and
128

1bid. at 224-26.

129

Tbid. at 225-27.

130Ibid. at 226.
131

1bid.

132

Ibid.

1331bid.
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demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The

evidence necessary to discharge the onus must be "cogent and

persuasive and make clear to the
court the consequences of
13 4
imposing or not imposing the limit."
Chief Justice Dickson's discussion of the onus of proof
follows his general discussion of section 1 in which he concluded
that the section imposes a stringent standard of justification for
limits. The imposition of a heavy onus on the party seeking to
justify a limit is one of the factors that causes the standard of
justification to be stringent. The Chief Justice gave two reasons to
support his conclusions about the onus. First, section 1 guarantees
the rights and freedoms, and limits are exceptions to this general
guarantee. Therefore, he said, "(t)he presumption is that the rights
and freedoms are guaranteed unless the party invoking s. 1 can
bring itself within the exceptional criteria which justify their being
limited."1 35
The Chief Justice's holding that the "presumption is that the
rights and freedoms are guaranteed" appears to mean that after a
judge holds that an enactment limits a right or freedom and enters
upon the section 1 analysis, there is a presumption that the limit
does not come within section 1; that is, there is a presumption that
the limit is unconstitutional. The onus on the party seeking to limit
is a heavy onus because that party must overcome the presumption
of unconstitutionality in order to persuade a judge that the limit
comes within section 1. The Chief Justice did not consider in
Oakes or Big M whether there is a presumption of constitutionality

134

1bid.at 227. Before the Supreme Court decision in Oakes, some lower court judges held
that the party seeking to limit bears the onus in the s. 1 analysis. See, for example, Southam,
supra, note 125 at 419-20. MacKinnon A.CJ.O. said, at 419, that the party seeking to uphold
the limit must establish that the limit comes within s. 1 "by evidence, by the terms and purpose
of the limiting law, its economic, social and political background, and, if felt helpful, by
references to comparable legislation of other acknowledged free and democratic societies." See
also Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of Censors (1983), 41
O.R (2d) 583 at 589-90, 147 D.L.R. (3d) 58 at 64-65 (Div. Ct), aff'd (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 80,
5 D.L.R. (4th) 766 (CA.) [hereinafter OntarioFilm and Video cited to D.L.R].
135

Oakes, ibid. at 226.
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in the first stage of Charter analysis, or which party bears the onus
136
in that stage.
The second reason the Chief Justice gave to support his
conclusions about the onus of proof turns on the presence in
section 1 of the words "demonstrably justified." These words, he
said, indicate not only that the onus is on the party seeking to
limit137 but also that the onus is a heavy one.138
What is the significance of the Chief Justice's holding that
the party seeking to justify a limit under section 1 has a heavy
onus?
This holding tends toward judicial activism and the
protection of the Charter rights and freedoms. It is arguable that
the justices of the Supreme Court intended by their ruling on onus
to signal a high degree of activism on their own part and to
encourage a high degree of activism on the part of lower court
judges. If the justices had wished to indicate that in the balancing
of values that takes place under section 1 they intended to exercise
restraint and to show deference to legislatures, they might have
imposed on the party relying on the Charter the onus of proving
that a limit does not come within section .19

136In OntarioFilm and Video, supra, note 134 at 64, the justices of the Ontario Divisional
Court suggested that there is a presumption of constitutionality at the first stage of Charter
analysis, but not at the second stage (the s. 1 analysis), because that stage is not reached until
after the judge holds that the enactment limits a right or freedom. In Southam, supra, note 125
at 420, MacKinnon A.C.J.O. suggested that there is no presumption of constitutionality at
either stage of Charter analysis, at least where the impugned legislative provision was enacted
before the Charter. See also Hogg, supra, note 100 at 681-82.
I suggest in the text that the statement in Oakes means not that there is no
presumption of constitutionality in the s. 1 analysis, but that there is a presumption of
unconstitutionality. In theory at least, the party seeking to limit has a heavier burden if it must
overcome a presumption of unconstitutionality than it has if there is no presumption either way.
1370akes at 226. "This is further substantiated by the use of the word 'demonstrably' which
clearly indicates that the onus of justification is on the party seeking to limit: Hunter v.
Southam Inc., supra." In Hunter,supra, note 7 at 660, Dickson CJ., speaking for the Court, said
"the phrase 'demonstrably justified' puts the onus of justifying a limitation on a right or
freedom set out in the Charter on the party seeking to limit."
138
0akes at 226. "Nevertheless, the preponderance of probability test must be applied
rigorously. Indeed, the phrase 'demonstrably justified' in s. 1 of the Charter supports this
conclusion."
139
In Southam, supra, note 125 at 420, counsel for the Crown argued that because there
is a presumption of constitutionality the party alleging an abridgement of the Charter has the
onus of proof under s. 1.
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The Chief Justice's ruling on the onus of proof means, at
least in formal terms, that the party seeking to limit a right or
freedom has a more difficult position in the section 1 analysis than
it would otherwise have. Often, but not always, the party seeking
to limit is a government or an agency of government. The ruling
on onus requires the government to establish, by evidence and
argument, each of the three elements required to bring the limit
within section 1. If the government does not lead evidence or
advance argument respecting any one of the elements, it has not
discharged its onus and the judge may hold that the limit is not
within section 1. If the government does lead evidence or advance
argument respecting a section 1 element, the judge may nevertheless
hold that the government has not established the element to "a very
high degree of probability"140 and, therefore, has not discharged its
onus.

Clearly, then, in formal terms, the decision to place a heavy
onus on the government in the section 1 analysis makes it harder
for government to succeed at this stage of the analysis, and easier
for judges to hold that a limit is not salvaged under section 1. In
this sense, the ruling on onus tends to promote activism, not
deference to legislatures.
However, the rule governing onus does not require justices
of the Supreme Court or lower courts to be activist in the section
1 analysis. In the application of the rule, the justices hearing each
particular case have a discretion to determine whether the
government has or has not discharged the onus it bears. For this
reason, the ruling on onus is not determinative of decision making
in individual cases. A justice inclined to exercise judicial restraint in
general or in a particular case will be more likely than a justice
inclined toward judicial activism to hold that the government has
satisfied the onus.
Further, one element in Oakes suggests that the justices of
the Supreme Court of Canada may not have intended their ruling
on onus to signal a high degree of activism. This is the statement
of the Chief Justice that although evidence is generally required to
prove the constituent elements of section 1, "there may be cases

14 0

Supra, text at note 131.
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where certain elements of the section 1 analysis are obvious or
self-evident. 141
If judges hold that an element of the section 1 analysis is
"obvious or self-evident," the onus on the government with respect
to that element is reduced to zero, and the standard of justification
with respect to that element is not at all stringent. Given that
holding, government is not required to lead evidence or advance
argument in order to establish that element. Indeed, if judges hold
that a section 1 element is "obvious or self-evident," it may be that
the party seeking the protection of the Charter is not permitted to
refute the existence of that element by evidence or argument.
Accordingly, the Chief Justice's statement that in some cases some
elements of section 1 may be obvious or self-evident is consistent
with judicial restraint and not with judicial activism.
In conclusion, I suggest that the rules governing onus in the
section 1 analysis are not determinative of decision making. In the
application of the rules, judges have leeway in deciding whether or
not government must lead evidence to establish an element of the
analysis and, if evidence is required, whether or not government has
adduced evidence that is convincing. Accordingly, judges are able to
manipulate the rules to justify decisions based on their policy
preferences and their views about the desirability of judicial activism
or restraint.
C. "Prescribedby Law"
The Supreme Court of Canada has not yet considered at
length the requirement of section 1 that a limit on a right or
freedom be prescribed by law. However, the Ontario Divisional
Court and the Federal Court of Appeal considered this requirement
in two early decisions. In Re Ontario Film and Video Appreciation

1410akes at 227. The Oakes case itself is an illustration of this. Although the government
introduced evidence of the increasing incidence of drug trafficking and of measures taken by
a number of nations to prevent drug trafficking, Dickson CJ. held at 229 that it is, "to a large
extent, self-evident" that the government's purpose in passing the impugned legislation (curbing
drug trafficking by facilitating the conviction of traffickers through the use of a reverse onus)
is a sufficiently important purpose to warrant a limitation of Charter rights and freedoms.
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Society and Ontario Board of Censors,142 three justices of the
Ontario Divisional Court held that provisions of the Theatres Act 43
authorising a Board of Censors to censor, or prohibit the exhibition
of, any film impose a limit on freedom of expression that is not
prescribed by law. In Luscher v. Deputy Minister, Revenue
Canada,144 Hugessen J., speaking for the Federal Court of Appeal,
held that provisions of the Customs Tariff Act 4s prohibiting the
importation of printed or pictorial material that is "immoral or
indecent" impose a limit on freedom of expression that is not a
reasonable limit prescribed by law. These decisions suggest that to
comply with the prescribed by law requirement a limit on a right or
freedom must have three features.
First, the judges of the Ontario Divisional Court held that in
order to be prescribed by law a limit must have the force of law.146
A limit must be contained in a statute, regulation or common law
rule "to ensure that it has been established democratically through
the legislative process or judicially through the operation of
precedent over the years."14 7 Applying this principle, the judges

held that policy statements issued by the Board of Censors setting
out the basis on which the Board censored films (for example,
sexual explicitness or violence) do not satisfy the prescribed by law
requirement, as policy statements that are not contained in
legislation or regulations do not have the force of law! 4s
The requirement that limits be established "democratically" or
"judicially" appears to be protective of the rights and freedoms;
142

143

Supra, note 134.
1LS.O. 1980, c. 498, ss 3, 35 and 38.

144(1985), [1985] 1 F.C. 85, 17 D.L.R. (4th) 503 (CA.) [hereinafter Luscher cited to
D.LR.].
14 5

RS.C. 1970, c. C-41, s. 14 and Sch. C, Item 99201-1.

14 6
OntarioFilm and Video, supra, note 134 at 67. Dickson CJ. said in Oakes, supra, note
2 at 224, "[t]he question whether the limit is 'prescribed by law' is not contentious in the
present case since s. 8 of the Narcotic ControlAct is a duly enacted legislative provision."
14 7

OntarioFilm and Video, ibid. at 67. See Hogg, supra, note 100 at 684.

14 8

OntarioFilm and Video, ibid. at 67.
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however, it is not a narrow requirement. Limits may be imposed
not only by legislation and regulations made by Order-in-Council,
but also by regulations made by agencies, such as the Law Society
of Upper Canada, 149 granted power by the legislature to make rules.
Further, legislative provisions containing limits may be administered
not only by courts but also by administrative agencies and officials
given authority to do so in properly framed legislation.
The second feature of the prescribed by law requirement is
that a limit on a right or freedom must be specific. A limit that is
vague, undefined, ambiguous, or uncertain"'0 is not a reasonable
limit prescribed by law. In Luscher, Hugessen J. held that as the
words "immoral" and "indecent" are not defined in the Customs
Tariff Act, and as the meanings of the words are subjective and
uncertain, the limit does not come within section 1.151
The justices in the two decisions suggested two rather
different reasons for the requirement of specificity or certainty. The
justices of the Ontario Divisional Court expressed the view that a
rule must be certain in order to be a law. "It is accepted that law
cannot be vague, undefined, and totally discretionary; it must be
ascertainable and understandable. Any limits placed on the freedom
of expression ... must be articulated with some precision or they
cannot be considered to be law."152 Hugessen J. reasoned that law
must be certain so that citizens may foresee the consequences of
their actions and regulate their conduct accordingly. He said,
"[w]hile there can never be absolute certainty, a limitation of a
guaranteed right must be such as to allow a very high degree of
predictability of the legal consequences." 15 3 Finally, Hugessen J.

149

1iein, supra, note 53.

15 0

Ontario Film and Video, supra, note 134 at 67; Luscher, supra, note 144 at 506.

151At 509-10. Unlike the judges of the Ontario Divisional Court who held that certainty
in a limit is required solely by the words "prescribed by law" in s. 1 of the Charter, Hugessen
J. held that certainty is required as well by the word "reasonable." See Luscher, ibid. at 506 and

510.
152

Ontario Film and Video, supra, note 134 at 67.

153Luschersupra,at 506. See Hogg, supra, note 100 at 684.
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noted that lack of certainty
in a legislative provision may be cured
s4
by judicial construction.l
This second feature of the prescribed by law requirement
appears to be protective of the rights and freedoms, and conducive
to judicial activism. However, as the "rule" requires only that a limit
have "some precision" or sufficient certainty to permit prediction of
legal consequences, the rule itself is imprecise and uncertain. The
judges deciding a particular case have freedom to determine
whether this rather vague standard has been met. A justice wishing
to exercise restraint and to defer to legislatures may be more easily
satisfied that a limit is sufficiently certain than a justice wishing to
protect Charter rights and freedoms.
Further, with respect to the possibility mentioned in Luscher
that uncertainty in a legislative provision may be cured by judicial
construction, it is not clear whether the judges hearing a Charter
challenge may themselves administer such a cure. Hugessen J. did
not discuss this; he seemed to have in mind that the judges hearing
the Charterchallenge may consider uncertainty in the legislation to
have been cured by earlier decisions construing the legislation.
However, if the judges hearing the challenge may overcome the
uncertainty by placing a precise construction on the statute, the
requirement is not as protective of the rights and freedoms as it
would otherwise be. Judges wishing to defer to the legislature may
be inclined to cure the defect and uphold the legislation.
The third feature of the prescribed by law requirement is a
special case of the second. If a legislative provision imposing a limit
on a right or freedom is to be administered by an official or an
administrative agency, the scope of the limit may not be left to the
55
uncontrolled discretion (the "whim") of the official or agency
The legislative provision must set the standard the official or agency
is to apply when exercising the discretion. If the legislative
provision does not set the standard, the discretion is uncontrolled
and the limit is uncertain. This is a special case of the general
requirement that a limit be certain.

1

54bLscher, ibid. at 507 and 508-10.

15 5
OntarioFilm and Video, supra, note 134, Div. Ct at 67, CA. at 767. See also Luscher
at 506 and 508.
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In Ontario Film and Video, the Theatres Act, by authorising
the Board to censor "any film," sets no standard and so gives the
Board an uncontrolled discretion "to censor or prohibit the
exhibition of any film of which it disapproves." 15 6 The limit would
be prescribed by law if the enactment set a standard sufficiently
precise to persuade a judge that the discretion granted to the Board
is a controlled discretion. For example, a judge may be satisfied if
an enactment authorizes a Board of Censors to prohibit the
exhibition of a film that is "sexually explicit" or that "exploits
violence." In each case the question is whether the standard is
sufficiently precise; in each case the answer may vary with the desire
of the justice to exercise restraint and deference to legislative
decision making or to be activist in order to protect the rights and
freedoms.
The rules developed by the justices of the Ontario Divisional
Court and the Federal Court of Appeal to govern the prescribed by
law requirement, like the rules developed by the justices of the
Supreme Court to govern other elements of Charter analysis, are
not determinative of decision making. Because the rules do not
indicate, except in general terms, what degree of certainty is
required, judges are free to invoke the rules to justify either judicial
restraint or judicial activism.
D. "SuchReasonable Limits ...
As Can Be DemonstrablyJustified ...".

Purposes, Means and Effects
The Oakes decision indicates that to determine whether a
legislative provision that limits a right or freedom is reasonable and
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, judges are to
consider the purposes of the legislative provision, the means used to
attain the purposes, and the effects of the limit on the right or
freedom. 7 A limit is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a

156

Div. Ct at 67.

15 7
In the relevant passages in Oakes, which are quoted in the text, infra, at notes 159, 182
and 191, Dickson C.J. spoke of objective (that is, purpose) and effect in both the singular and
plural forms. This perhaps reflects the fact that in Oakes the Chief Justice did not focus
(continued...)
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free and democratic society if the purposes, the means, and the
effects are reasonable and demonstrably justified.
The section 1 analysis is not the only stage of Charter
analysis at which judges must consider the purposes and effects of
a challenged enactment. In the first stage of the analysis, judges
consider the purposes and effects of the enactment to determine
whether the enactment limits a right or freedom. However, at that
stage they need not consider purposes and effects fully. If they
hold, for example, that one purpose of the enactment is to limit a
right or freedom, they need not consider other purposes of the
enactment or the effects of the enactment.158 In the section 1
analysis, judges are required to consider the purposes and effects of
the enactment more fully, and to consider the means for the first
time. I shall discuss each of these.
1. Purposes
When he discussed the assessment of legislative purpose in
Oakes, Dickson ci. did not distinguish between the requirement of
reasonableness and the requirement of demonstrable justification.
Apparently applying both requirements, he held that judges are to
consider two factors when deciding whether the purposes of a
limiting enactment are reasonable and demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society. First, are the purposes consistent with
the principles of a free and democratic society? Second, are the
purposes sufficiently important to justify a limit?
The principal passage in which he developed this rule reads
as follows:
First, the objective, which the measures responsible for a limit on a Charter right or
freedom are designed to serve, must be "of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom": R v. Big MDrugMartLtd.,

157(...continued)
particularly on whether the enactment had more than one purpose, means and effect. When
stating or referring to the rules that may be derived from Oakes, I speak where appropriate of

purposes, means and effects in the plural as judges may identify more than one of each for an
enactment. For example, in Big M, supra, note 1 at 338, the Chief Justice identified two
purposes of the enactment under consideration.
15 8

see supra, text at notes 81 and 87.
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supra, at p. 430 C.C.C., p. 366 D.LR., p. 352 S.C.R. The standard must be high in
order to ensure that objectives which are trivial or discordant with the principles
integral to a free and democratic society do not gain s. 1 protection. It is necessary,
at a minimum, that an objective relate to concerns which are pressing and substantial
in a free &
democratic society before it can be characterized as sufficiently
important.

In articulating the two factors that judges should consider
when assessing the purposes of a limit, the Chief Justice used
several descriptive phrases that are likely to become important
elements in the developing jurisprudence. For a limit to come
within section 1, the purposes for which the limit is imposed must
be:
1. concordant (not discordant) with the principles integral to
a free and democratic society,
2. related to concerns which are pressing and substantial in
a free and democratic society, and
3. of sufficient importance to warrant overriding a
constitutionally protected right or freedom; not trivial.
Two additional descriptive phrases may be added to the
three set out above. The purposes of a limiting enactment are
reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
society if they are:
4. collective goals of fundamental importance, and
5. related to the protection of social values of
superordinate importance.
The fourth descriptive phrase appears in a passage in Oakes
in which Dickson cJ. said "[iut may become necessary to limit rights
and freedoms in circumstances where their exercise would be

159

0akes, supra, note 2 at 227. The passage in Big M, supra, note 1, to which the Chief
Justice referred appears at 366 and reads as follows:
At the outset, it should be noted that not every government interest or policy
objective is entitled to s. 1 consideration. Principles will have to be developed for
recognizing which government objectives are of sufficient importance to warrant
overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom.
Once a sufficiently
significant government interest is recognized then it must be decided if the means
chosen to achieve this interest are reasonable - a form of proportionality test. The
court may wish to ask whether the means adopted to achieve the end sought do so
by impairing as little as possible the right or freedom in question.
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inimical to the
realization of collective goals of fundamental
1 0
importance." 6
The fifth descriptive phrase appears in A.G. Nova Scotia v.
Maclntyre, a pre-Charter decision in which Dickson J., as he then
was, held that after a search warrant has been executed, the public
is entitled to inspect the warrant and the documents that were used
to support the application for the warrant. Dickson J. said "[i]n my
view, curtailment of public accessibility can only be justified where
there is present the need to protect social values of superordinate
161
importance.
The first of the five descriptive phrases states the first factor
to be considered when assessing the purposes of a limit, that is,
whether the purposes are consistent with the principles of a free
and democratic society. The third and fourth phrases relate to the
second factor, that is, the importance of the purposes. The second
and fifth phrases appear to relate to both factors 62
The rules that Dickson cu. developed to govern the
assessment of legislative purpose in the section 1 analysis, coupled
with the rule governing the onus in the section 1 analysis, appear to
impose a high standard of justification on government. In order to
bring a limit within section 1, government must convince judges that
the purposes of the legislative provision are both consistent with
the principles of a free and democratic society and important. As
in other areas of Charteranalysis, the rules seem to be conducive to
judicial activism and the protection of the Charter rights and
freedoms. However, there are several considerations which suggest
that this is not the case.
Before justices decide whether the purposes of a legislative
provision are concordant with the principles of a free and
democratic society and sufficiently important to justify a limit of a
160Oakes, ibid. at 225.

161(1982), [1982] 1 S.C.RI 175 at 186-87, 132 D.L.R. (3d) 385 at 403. In Southanz, supra,
note 125, MacKinnon A.CJ.O. quoted this passage from the Mclnre case at 416, and referred
to the phrase "social values of superordinate importance" at 430.
1 62

The expression "compelling state interest," used by judges in the United States when

applying "strict scrutiny," relates to the importance of the state legislative purposes. For a
discussion of the levels of scrutiny in United States equal protection decisions see, infra, text

at notes 205-13.
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right or freedom, they must identify the purposes of the legislative
provision. The process of identifying legislative purposes is not a
163
search controlled by clear rules which lead to a single conclusion.
The judicial task is not to seek an element contained within the
enactment which may be discovered by a careful search; it is rather
to impose upon the enactment a theory about the enactment
selected by creative choice from among a number of possible
theories. Because the process is indeterminate, this is another point
in the Charter analysis at which judges are not controlled by rules;
rather, they are free to use the analysis to select purposes which
allow them readily to uphold or invalidate the legislation on the
basis of their assessment of its wisdom, or on the basis of their
general desire to exercise activism or restraint.
The process of identifying the purposes of a legislative
provision is indeterminate for several reasons. Judges may look to
different sources in their efforts to identify the purposes. They may
look to the legislation itself which may contain a statement of
purpose, to commission or committee reports prepared when the
legislation was adopted, perhaps to statements made in the
legislature, to evidence given by expert witnesses, and to arguments
advanced by counsel. A consideration of the enactment itself and
of these other sources is likely to suggest not a single purpose but
a number of possible purposes. For example, Sunday legislation
may be passed for the purpose of enforcing observance of the
Christian Sabbath, or for the purpose of imposing a single day of
rest.lt 4 Obscenity legislation may be passed for the purpose of
maintaining moral standards, discouraging acts of sexual violence,

163J.W. Torke, 'The Judicial Process in Equal Protection Cases" (1982) 9 Hastings
Constitutional L.Q. 279 at 292-317. Professor Torke considered United States equal protection
jurisprudence in which the formal rules require judges to determine the purposes of a

challenged statute and whether the classification used in the statute is rationally related to the
achievement of the purposes.

Professor Torke argued convincingly that as the choice of

purpose is not controlled by rules, "the purpose factor is almost infinitely manipulable." (See
293.) Further, he argued that judges use the broad freedom they have in identifying purpose
to give effect to moral values.
164See supra, text at note 84.
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preventing the degradation of women, or preventing the imposition
of obscene material on those who find it offensive.1 65
When an enactment and the other sources that judges
consider suggest more than one possible purpose, judges are free to
proceed along different lines of reasoning. Some may select one
purpose as the sole purpose of the enactment; but they may
disagree about which purpose to select. Others may select two or
more purposes as the purposes of the enactment, again with the
possibility that they may disagree about which purposes to select.
Judges who select more than one purpose may hold that one of the
selected purposes is more important than the others, or that all the
selected purposes are of equal importance. Again, there is room for
justices to disagree with one another.
Further, judges may state the purposes they select in narrow
terms by focusing on the particular provisions of the statute, or in
broad terms by abstracting many particulars of the statute.1 For
example, the purpose of the reverse onus provision considered in
Oakes may be stated narrowly as imposing on persons charged with
possession of narcotics for the purpose of trafficking the onus of
disproving an intention to traffic after the Crown has established
possession.1 67 The Chief Justice stated the purpose more broadly as
"curbing drug trafficking by facilitating the conviction of drug
traffickers,"16s and more broadly still as "protecting our society from
169
the grave ills associated with drug trafficking.
Accordingly, the process of identifying legislative purposes is
indeterminate, and allows judges to select one purpose or several
purposes from among a broad range of purposes. Judges who

165

See Justice Wilson's discussion of the purposes of obscenity legislation in Towne Cinema
Theatres Ltd. v. R. (1985), [1985] 1 S.C.IR 494 at 524-25, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 1 at 25-27.
166See Torke, supra, note 163 at 295-99.
167

In Oakes, the justices considered the validity of s. 8 of the Narcotic Control Act, R.S.C.
1970, c. N-1.
168

0akes,supra, note 2 at 228.

169

1bid. at 229. The broadest statement of the legislative purpose may lead more readily
than the narrower statements to the conclusion that the purpose is sufficiently important to
bring the limit within s. 1.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VCOL. 25 No. 1

disagree with one another in identifying the purposes of a limiting
enactment, determining which of several purposes are most
important, or determining the level of generality at which the
purposes are to be stated may on any one of these grounds alone
reach different conclusions on the question whether the purposes
are concordant with the principles of a free and democratic society
and sufficiently important to warrant a limit on a right or freedom.
The leeway justices have in identifying the purposes of a
limiting enactment is increased by a doctrinal feature of the section
1 analysis. In Oakes, Dickson ci. held that elements of the section
1 analysis may be obvious or self-evident.17 If this is applied to the
determination of purpose in a case in which the government
advances no evidence of purpose, judges wishing to uphold a limit
on a right or freedom may speculate about the purposes of the
limit, supply a purpose and determine that the purpose supplied
serves to bring the limit within the protection of section 1.17
It is arguable that the broad discretion individual judges have
in identifying purposes may be reduced if rules governing the
process are devised. It is not likely, however, that the discretion
may be eliminated as a significant factor in decision making. So far,
at least, few rules of this sort have been developed. Two rules
should be mentioned. In Big M, Dickson ci. held that in the first
stage of Chatter analysis, when judges consider purpose to determine
whether an enactment limits a right or freedom, the relevant
purpose is the legislature's purpose at the time the legislation was
passed, not at the time of the litigation.17 2 Presumably, a similar
rule will be adopted for the identification of purpose in the section
1 analysis. Dickson ci. reasoned that the "shifting purpose"
approach, under which legislative purposes are deemed to change as
social conditions change, creates uncertainty and encourages
re-litigation because it permits judges to hold an enactment valid at
one time and invalid at a later time on the basis of "a revised

170

1bid. at 227. See supra, text at note 141.

1 71

Cf. Torke, supra, note 163 at 307.

172Supra, note 1 at 352-53.
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judicial assessment of purpose."1 73 On the other hand it is arguable
that the "shifting purpose" approach leads to greater relevance and
economy in Charter adjudication. It seems wasteful to have judges
strike down a limiting provision on the ground that its original
purposes do not bring it within section 1, and later uphold the
provision, if it is re-enacted, on the ground that its current purposes
do bring it within section 1.174
In Big M, Dickson cj. developed a second rule respecting
identification of purpose. He held, and Wilson J. agreed, that in
the section 1 analysis, government may not rely upon a purpose for
a limiting enactment that is an ultra vires purpose in the context of
the federal division of powers. 1 T7 Applying this rule in the section
1 analysis in Big M, Dickson cj. rejected the federal government's
argument that the purpose of section 4 of the Lord's Day Act1 76 is
to impose a universal day of rest, because the section
would be
177
invalid as federal legislation if that were its purpose.
After justices identify the purposes of a limiting enactment
they must determine whether the purposes are concordant with the
principles of a free and democratic society and sufficiently important
to warrant the limit.178 These two requirements may perhaps be
understood as applications of the section 1 standard of justification
that the Chief Justice developed in Oakes.t79 The standard of
justification requires that a limit of a right or freedom be measured
against the "values and principles essential to a free and democratic
society." These values and principles include respect for human
dignity, social justice, equality, diversity of beliefs, cultural and group
identity, and the institutions of participatory democracy.
1 73

1bid. at 352.

1 74

See supra, text at notes 78-80.

175

Supra, note 1 at 366-67 and 373.

176Supra, note 17.
177See supra, text at note 117.
178See supra, text at note 159.
179

See supra, text at notes 123-24.
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The requirement that the purposes of a limiting enactment

must be concordant with the principles of a free and democratic
society is a direct application of the standard of justification; that is,
it directly measures the legislative purposes against the values and
principles of a free and democratic society.
The second
requirement, that the purposes must, in addition, be important,
seems to give additional protection to the values and principles of
a free and democratic society.180
Judges have considerable leeway in determining whether the
purposes of a limiting enactment are concordant with the principles
of a free and democratic society for the same reasons that they have
leeway in applying the standard of justification generally. First, the
principles are stated in general terms and so their meanings are not
precise. Second, because there are several principles, a legislative
purpose may be concordant with some of the principles and
discordant with others. Whether justices hold that a legislative
purpose is concordant with the principles of a free and democratic
society depends on which values and principles they emphasize and
how they define those values and principles.181 Therefore, two
justices considering the same legislative purpose may disagree on the
issue whether the purpose is concordant with the principles of a
free and democratic society.
Similarly, judges have discretion in determining whether the
purposes of a limiting enactment are sufficiently important to justify
a limit of a right or freedom. The rules developed by Chief Justice
Dickson speak of "sufficient" and "fundamental" importance, and
"pressing and substantial" concerns. These expressions do not
contain standards which control decision making by justices in
individual cases. Two justices considering the same legislative
purpose may disagree on the issue whether the purpose is
sufficiently important to justify a limit on a right or freedom.

18 0
Query whether in terms of doctrine it is helpful to relate the first requirement to
reasonableness and the second to demonstrable justification. This defines reasonableness as
concordance with the principles of a free and democratic society. In stating the standard of
justification, the Chief Justice did not suggest that the values and principles of a free and
democratic society are related to reasonableness rather than demonstrable justification.
181

See supra, text at note 126.
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I conclude that the rules governing the identification and
assessment of legislative purposes in the section 1 analysis do not
require justices to engage in judicial activism in Charter adjudication.
The rules are indeterminate and do not control decision making in
individual cases. Judges relying on the same rules may reach
contradictory conclusions when they identify the purposes of a
limiting enactment, and when they consider whether the purposes
identified comply with the requirements necessary to bring the limit
within section 1. Judges may use the indetermination in the rules
to give effect to their policy preferences and their views about the
desirability of judicial activism or restraint.
2. Means
In Oakes, Dickson cJ. developed what he called "a form of
proportionality test" which judges are to apply when deciding
whether the means used in a limiting enactment are reasonable and
demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. The
proportionality test contains three components. The Chief Justice
began his discussion of the test with the suggestion that it relates
wholly to the assessment of means. However, his elaboration of the
test indicates that the first two components relate to the assessment
of the means used in a limiting enactment, and the third component
relates to the assessment of the effects of the enactment on a right
or freedom. He stated the first two components in the following
terms:
... once a sufficiently significant objective is recognized, then the party invoking
section 1 must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably
justified. This involves "a form of proportionality test": R v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd.,
supra. Although the nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on the
circumstances, in each case courts will be required to balance the interests of society

with those of individuals and groups. There are, in my view, three important
components of a proportionality test. First, the measures adopted must be carefully
designed to achieve the objective in question. They must not be arbitrary, unfair, or

based on irrational considerations. In short, they must be rationally connected to
the objective. Second, the means, even if rationally connected to the objective in this
first sense, should impair "as litte8 as possible" the right or freedom in question: R

v. Big M DrugMart Ltd., supra...

182

0akes, supra, note 2 at 227. The passage in Big M to which Dickson CJ. referred is

quoted in note 159, supra.
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Although the Chief Justice held that the test to determine
whether the means comply with the section 1 requirements of
reasonableness and demonstrable justification contains two
components, he did not expressly relate one component to
reasonableness and the other to demonstrable justification. In terms
of doctrine it is arguable (and judges may later hold) that the first
component relates to reasonableness because it requires a rational
connection between purposes and means, and that the second
component relates to demonstrable justification because it stipulates
that the means must meet a standard higher than mere rationality. 11
If the first component of the proportionality test relates to
the section 1 requirement of reasonableness, it may be stated as
follows: for a limit on a right or freedom to be reasonable, the
means used to achieve the legislative purposes must be reasonable.
The means are reasonable if they are "carefully designed to achieve
the objective" or "rationally connected to the objective"; they must
not be "arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations."
If the second component of the proportionality test relates
to the requirement of demonstrable justification, it may be stated as
follows: for a limit to be demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society, the means used must be the least restrictive
means, that is, the means that achieve the legislative purposes with
the least possible restriction on the rights and freedoms. If it is
possible to achieve the legislative purposes by using alternative
means that impose a lesser restriction on the right or freedom, then
the alternative means, not the means actually used in the legislation,
are the demonstrably justified means.
In his statement of the first two components of the
proportionality test, the Chief Justice did not hold explicitly that the
means used in a limiting enactment must be consistent with the
values and principles of a free and democratic society. This may be
implicit because the standard of justification in the section 1 analysis
imposes this requirement.-1 4 The Chief Justice did make specific

183See infra, text at note 214.
184See supra, text at notes 123-24.
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reference to this requirement in his discussion of purposes1 8 5 and
effects;18 6 justices in future cases may explicitly rule that this
requirement of the section 1 standard of justification applies to the
assessment of means as well.
Like the rules governing the assessment of purposes, the
rules that Dickson cJ. developed to govern the assessment of means,
coupled with the rule governing onus in the section 1 analysis,
appear to impose a high standard of justification on government.
The rules require government to show that the means used in a
limiting enactment are rationally related to the achievement of the
legislative purposes, that they impose a lesser restriction on the right
or freedom limited than any other means that might have been used
to achieve the purposes, and (probably) that they are consistent with
the values and principles integral to a free and democratic society.
The rules seem to require judicial activism and to give a broad
protection to the Charter rights and freedoms. However, I argue
here, as I do with respect to other elements of the Charter analysis,
that the rules developed to govern the assessment of means are
indeterminate. They mandate neither activism nor restraint. Judges
may manipulate the rules to give effect to their policy preferences
and their views about the desirability of judicial activism or restraint.
The rule that the means used in a limiting enactment must
be rationally related to the purposes of the enactment is
indeterminate for several reasons. First, whether means and
purposes are rationally related depends in part on what the
purposes of the limiting enactment are.18 7 I argue above 88 that
judges have considerable leeway in selecting the purposes of an
enactment. If two judges identify different purposes, one may hold

185

See supra, text at notes 159 and 178-81.

18 6

See infra, text at notes 202-203.

18 7

For this reason Professors Torke and Linde reject Professor Gunther's view that judges
may reduce the scope of value judgement in judicial review of equal protection cases by
focusing on means instead of purposes. See Torke, supra, note 163 at 284-85 and 323; Linde,
supra, note 80 at 203-04, 207-13 esp. 208. And see G. Gunther, "Foreward: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection" (1972) 86
Harv. LiL 1 at 21-23.

188Supra, text at notes 163-69.
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that the means are rationally related to the achievement of the
purpose she/he identified, and the other may hold that the means
are not rationally related to the achievement of the purpose she/he
identified. Accordingly, a judge wishing to show deference to
legislatures, and a judge wishing actively to protect the rights and
freedoms may disagree in their assessment of means for the sole
reason that earlier in the analysis they disagreed in their
identification of legislative purpose.
Further, the rule that means must be rationally related to
purposes is indeterminate because the meaning of the rationality
requirement is not clear. A judge who wishes to exercise restraint
may take the view that government may satisfy the requirement by
showing only that the legislature had a rational basis, for example,
the opinion of experts, for concluding that the means will achieve
the legislative purposes.
An activist judge may hold that
government must demonstrate that the means will in fact likely
achieve the purposes, or that the means will in fact necessarily
achieve the purposes. Further, if rules are developed to clarify the
meaning of the rationality requirement, judges may still disagree
with one other in the application of the requirement. For example,
judges may disagree whether the expert opinion on which the
legislature relied provides a rational basis for the belief that the
means will achieve the legislative purposes; or whether on the facts
of a particular case1 the
means will likely or necessarily achieve the
89
purposes.
legislative

189

1n Oakes, supra, note 2 at 229-30, Dickson Ci. held that the means used to achieve the
legislative objective are not rational. Section 8 of the Narcotic ControlAct, supra, note 167,
provided that in a prosecution for possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, if the
court finds that the accused had possession, the accused has the onus of establishing that the

possession was not for the purpose of trafficking. Dickson CJ. held that the section limits the
right guaranteed by s. 11 of the Charterto be presumed innocent, and that the reverse onus is
not "rationally related to the objective of curbing drug trafficking." He said at 229, "... it would
be irrational to infer that a person had an intent to traffic on the basis of his or her possession

of a very small quantity of narcotics."
On the other hand, one might argue that the section, although a limit on the right
to be presumed innocent, is not irrational as the presumption is rebuttable; and that the means
are rationally related to the achievement of one of the purposes identified by the Chief Justice
at 228, "curbing drug trafficking by facilitating the conviction of drug traffickers." On this
view, the possibility that the section may also facilitate the conviction of simple possessors on
charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking, indicates not that the means are irrational

but that they are not the least restrictive means. This analysis, while leading to the same result
as that reached in Oakes, suggests that in Oakes itself judges might have differed from one
(continued...)

1987]

The Application of the Charter

The rule that the means used in a limiting enactment must
be the least restrictive means is also indeterminate. Judges wishing
to defer to legislatures and judges wishing to protect the rights and
freedoms may differ in their assessment of which of two alternative
means is the least restrictive. Where judges agree that the means
used in the enactment are more restrictive than an alternative
means that might have been used, they may differ on the question
whether the alternative means will achieve the legislative purposes.
Finally, if judges adopt a rule that the means used in a
limiting enactment must be consistent with the values and principles
integral to a free and democratic society, this rule too is not
determinative of decisions. This rule derives from the section 1
standard of justification. Judges may disagree with one another
when they apply the standard of justification to the assessment of
means for the same reasons that they may disagree with one
another when they apply the standard at other points in the section
1 analysis: the meaning of the standard depends in any particular
case on which of several values and principles the justices emphasize
and on how they define those values and principles.1 °
I conclude that the rules governing the assessment of means
in the section 1 analysis are indeterminate. Therefore, judges may
manipulate the rules in particular cases to support either the
conclusion that the means are reasonable and demonstrably justified
or the conclusion that they are not reasonable and demonstrably
justified. Judges may use the leeway they derive from the
indetermination of the rules to give effect to their policy
preferences and their views about the desirability of judicial activism
or restraint.
3. Effects
The assessment of the effects of a limiting enactment in the
section 1 analysis is governed by the third component of the
189(...continued)
another on the question whether the means are rationally related to the achievement of the
legislative purpose.
190See supra, text at notes 126 and 181.
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proportionality test developed by the Chief Justice in Oakes. The
Chief Justice stated the third component in the following terms:
Thirdly, there must be a proportionality between the effects of the measures which

are responsible for limiting the Charterright or freedom, and the objective which has
been identified as of "sufficient importance."

With respect to the third component, it is clear that the general effect of
any measure impugned under section 1 will be the infringement of a right or
freedom guaranteed by the Charter;,this is the reason why resort to section 1 is
necessary. The inquiry into effects must, however, go further. A wide range of
rights and freedoms are guaranteed by the Charter,and an almost infinite number
of factual situations may arise in respect of these. Some limits on rights and

freedoms protected by the Charterwill be more serious than others in terms of the
nature of the right or freedom violated, the extent of the violation and the degree
to which the measures which impose the limit trench upon the integral principles of

a free and democratic society. Even if an objective is of sufficient importance, and
the first two elements of the proportionality test are satisfied, it is still possible that,
because of the severity of the deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or
groups, the measure will not be justified by the purposes it is intended to serve. The
more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective

must be if the meame is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society.

The rule stated in the third component is that judges are to
assess the effects of a limiting enactment by determining whether
there is a "proportionality" between the severity of the effects of the
enactment on a right or freedom and the importance of the
purposes which the legislature intended to achieve through the
enactment. The search for proportionality is a search for a proper
relationship, a balance, between effects and purposes. "The more
severe the deleterious effects .., the more important the objective
must be ..." for the limiting enactment to be upheld under section 1.

If judges hold that the injurious effects of the enactment on the
right or freedom are too severe to be justified by the importance of
the purposes, or that the purposes are not sufficiently important to
justify the severity of the effects, they are to rule that the limit is
not preserved by section 1, notwithstanding their ruling earlier in
the section 1 analysis that the purposes and means satisfy the tests
necessary to bring the limit within section 1.
Like the rules governing the assessment of legislative
purposes and means in the section 1 analysis, the test developed by
the Chief Justice to govern the assessment of effects appears to
impose a high standard of justification on government. Judges are
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to apply the third component after they determine that both the
purposes of the limiting provision and the means used to achieve
the purposes are reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and
democratic society. When they apply the third component, judges
may hold that, despite those determinations, the limit is not within
section 1. It appears that the test, because it may exclude from
section 1 a limit which on all other tests is within section 1, may
operate only against government and never in favour of government.
Therefore, the test seems to mandate judicial activism and the
protection of the Charter rights and freedoms. I argue, however,
that this is not the case.
Analytically, the process by which judges are to assess the
effects of a limiting enactment contains three steps. First, judges
must identify and assess the importance of the purposes of the
enactment. Second, they must identify and assess the severity of the
effects of the enactment on the right or freedom limited. Third,
they must determine whether there is an appropriate balance
between the importance of the purposes and the severity of the
effects. I argue that the judges' decisions at each step of this
process are not controlled by determinative rules. Therefore, judges
have considerable leeway when they assess the effects of a limiting
enactment, and they may use this leeway to justify either activism or
restraint.
First, justices have considerable leeway when they identify
the purposes of the limiting enactment and assess the importance of
the purposes. The justices are not actually required to undertake
the inquiry into purposes at this stage of the analysis as they do so
at the beginning of the section 1 analysis when they consider
whether the purposes are reasonable and demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society 92 When I discuss that part of the
section 1 analysis, I argue that the rules governing the inquiry into
legislative purposes are indeterminate. 193 As the outcome of the
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See supra, text at notes 159-81. The justices may also consider purposes at the first

stage of Charter analysis to determine whether the impugned enactment imposes a limit on a
right or freedom. However, judges who hold that an effect of the enactment is to limit a right
or freedom may not consider the purposes of the enactment at the first stage of Charter
analysis. See, supra, text at notes 72-86.
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See supra, text at notes 163-81.
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enquiry into purposes is an essential element of the assessment of
effects under the third component of the proportionality test, the
assessment of effects is also characterized by indetermination and
judicial freedom in decision making.
Second, justices have considerable leeway in decision making
when they identify the effects of a limiting enactment and assess the
severity of the effects on the right or freedom limited. Judges
undertake their most thorough analysis of the effects of a limiting
enactment at this stage of Charter analysis, although they may
consider effects to some extent both in the first stage of Charter
analysis and earlier in the section 1 analysis. In the first stage of
Charter analysis, they may consider effects to determine whether an
enactment limits a right or freedom. However, they may not
consider effects at all at that stage if they hold that a purpose of
the enactment is to limit a right or freedom.19 4 If judges do
consider effects at that stage, and if they adopt a "substantial
effects" rule, they may consider whether the enactment affects a
right or freedom "substantially."19 5 That inquiry is similar to the
inquiry into the severity of effects that judges undertake when they
assess effects under the third component of the proportionality test.
However, the purposes of the two inquiries are different. In the
first stage of Charteranalysis judges ask whether the effects of the
enactment on the right or freedom are so substantial that they
warrant a holding that the enactment limits the right or freedom.
In the section 1 analysis judges ask whether the effects are so
severe that, when balanced against the purposes of the enactment,
they warrant a holding that the limit does not come within section
1.
Judges may also consider effects earlier in the section 1
analysis when they determine whether the means used in a limiting
enactment are the least restrictive means.19 6 This determination
touches on the severity of the effects of the enactment because the
means used determine how severely the enactment affects the right
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or freedom. However, the concern at that stage of the analysis is
not to balance effects against purposes, but to inquire whether the
means used in the enactment produce a more severe effect on the
right or freedom than an alternative means might produce.
When I discuss the judges' consideration of effects in the
first stage of Charter analysis to determine whether an enactment
limits a right or freedom, I argue that the processes by which judges
identify the effects of an enactment and assess the "substantiality"
(severity) of the effects are complex and indeterminate. 19 As the
identification of effects and the assessment of their severity is an
essential element of the assessment of effects under the third
component of the proportionality test, the assessment of effects is
also characterized by indetermination and judicial freedom in
decision making.
In his articulation of the third component of the
proportionality test, the Chief Justice indicated three factors that
judges should consider when assessing the severity of the effects of
a limiting enactment. These factors are (1) "the nature of the right
or freedom violated," (2) "the extent of the violation," and (3) "the
degree to which the measures which impose the limit trench upon
the integral principles of a free and democratic society."198 I argue
that these factors are indeterminate and do not control the judicial
assessment of the severity of the effects of a limiting enactment.
The first factor the Chief Justice directed judges to consider
when assessing the severity of effects is "the nature of the right or
freedom violated." This suggests that some rights and freedoms or
some classes of rights and freedoms19 are to be "preferred" in the
sense that when an enactment limits these rights and freedoms
judges are to hold more readily than they do when an enactment
limits other (non-preferred) rights and freedoms that the effects of
the limit are severe. The result of a judicial readiness to hold that
the effects are severe when an enactment limits a preferred right or
197Supra, text at notes 87-94.
198Supra, text at note 191.
199
The Charteridentifies several classes of rights and freedoms - fundamental freedoms in
s. 2, democratic rights in ss 3-5, mobility rights in s. 6, legal rights in ss 7-14, equality rights in
s. 15, official language rights in ss 16-22, and minority language educational rights in s. 23.
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freedom is that judges will be less likely to hold that the purposes
of the enactment are sufficiently important to achieve the
proportionality necessary to bring the limit within section 1. In this
way, judges may give greater protection to preferred rights and
freedoms than to non-preferred rights and freedoms by subjecting
2
limits of preferred rights and freedoms to a high level of scrutiny 00
in the section 1 analysis.
Whether the Chief Justice intended to draw this sort of
distinction between preferred rights and freedoms and non-preferred
rights and freedoms, and whether doctrine develops to elaborate
such a distinction must await further decisions. Here I note that
the direction to judges to consider "the nature of the right or
freedom violated" does not control the judicial assessment of the
severity of effects because (at least at present) there are no rules to
indicate which rights and freedoms or classes of rights and freedoms
are to be "preferred."
The second factor the Chief Justice directed judges to
consider when assessing the severity of effects is "the extent of the
violation." This factor does not render the assessment of effects
determinate because it is tautological; that is, it directs judges to
assess the severity of the effects by considering the severity of the
effects. This factor does not contain a standard by which to
measure the magnitude of an injurious effect on a right or freedom.
In this respect it is like the rule requiring judges to determine
whether legislative purposes are "sufficiently important" to justify a
limit,201 which does not contain a standard by which to measure the
importance of the purposes. Neither rule controls decision making
by judges in individual cases.
The third factor the Chief Justice directed judges to
consider is "the degree to which" the limit "trench(es) upon the
integral principles of a free and democratic society." This suggests
that when a limiting enactment impairs a principle considered
integral to a free and democratic society, judges are to hold more
readily than they do in other cases that the effects of the limit are
severe. As a result, judges will be less likely to hold that the
20

0See infra, text at notes 205-13 and 217.

201

See supra, text following note 181.
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purposes of the enactment are sufficiently important to achieve the
proportionality necessary to bring the limit within section 1. In this
way, judges may give a high degree of protection to principles
considered integral to a free and democratic society by subjecting
limits which impair these principles to a high level of scrutiny2 2 in
the section 1 analysis.
The direction to judges to consider the degree to which a
limit impairs the integral principles of a free and democratic society
is an application of the section 1 standard of justification. The
direction does not control the assessment of the severity of the
effects of a limit for the same reasons that the standard of
justification does not control decisions at other points in the section
1 analysis. A limit may affect some principles integral to a free and
democratic society negatively and others positively. A determination
that a limit impairs these principles, like the application of the
standard of justification generally, depends on which of several
principles the justices emphasize and on how they define those
203
principles.
Third, justices have considerable leeway when they balance
the importance of the purposes of a limit against the severity of the
effects of the limit on a right or freedom. The direction to balance
these factors contains no indication of the matters judges should
consider in the balancing process; it contains no standard to control
the way in which judges strike the balance. The Chief Justice said,
"[t]he more severe the deleterious effects of a measure, the more
important the objective must be......204 It may be that the Chief
Justice intended by this statement to encourage judges to engage in
judicial activism and to hold that limits that severely affect a right or
freedom do not come within section 1. If so, judges wishing to
exercise restraint and to uphold limits may in their decisions revise
the statement to read, "the more important the objective is, the
more severe the deleterious effects may be." Actually, it is not
necessary for restrained judges to revise the statement of the Chief
202

See infra, text at notes 205-13 and 218.
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Justice. Both activist judges and restrained judges may invoke the
statement in its present form. Activist judges may hold that
however important the purposes are, the effects on the right or
freedom are so severe that the two are not proportional and the
limit is not preserved by section 1. Restrained judges may hold that
however severe the effects are, the purposes are so important that
the two are proportional and the limit is preserved by section 1.
I conclude that the rules governing the assessment of the
importance of purposes, the assessment of the severity of effects,
and the balancing of purposes and effects are indeterminate. As
judges may disagree with one another when they apply these rules,
they may disagree on the question whether the effects of a limit are
reasonable and demonstrably justified.
Judges may use the
indetermination of the rules to give effect to their policy
preferences and their views about the desirability of judicial activism
or restraint.
E. Section I and Levels of Scrutiny
In their approach to section 1, the justices of the Supreme
Court of Canada developed doctrine which on its face suggests that
they intended to embrace judicial activism in order to protect the
Charterrights and freedoms, that they intended to encourage lower
court judges to adopt a similar position, and that they intended to
insist on a high standard of justification in order to make it difficult
for government to salvage a limit by bringing it within section 1.
The elements of the section 1 analysis which point in this direction
are the following:
1. the presumption that a limiting enactment is
unconstitutional; that is, the presumption that a limit does not come
within section 1;
2. the heavy onus on government of persuading judges that
a limit comes within section 1;
3. the rule that for a limit to come within section 1 the
purposes of the limiting enactment must be very important and
concordant with the principles of a free and democratic society;

1987]

The Application of the Charter

4. the rule that for a limit to come within section 1 the
means used to achieve the purposes must be the least restrictive
means; and
5. the rule that for a limit to come within section 1 the
effects of the limit on the right or freedom must be proportional to
the importance of the purposes of the limiting enactment.
Notwithstanding these indications of activism in the doctrine
of the section 1 analysis, I attempt to show that the doctrine does
not control decision making and may be used by justices to support
either activism or restraint. I recognize, nevertheless, that the
justices might have developed quite different doctrine for the
section 1 analysis, albeit doctrine which itself would not be
determinative of decision making. If the justices wished to signal
that they intended to be restrained in their approach to Charter
adjudication and to defer to the legislative will, and if they wished
to make it easy for government to salvage a limit by bringing it
within section 1, they might have developed doctrine with the
following features:
1. a presumption that a limiting enactment is constitutional;
that is, a presumption that a limit comes within section 1;
2. an onus on the party relying on the Charter of showing
that a limit does not come within section 1;
3. a rule that for a limit to come within section 1, it is
sufficient that the purposes of the limiting enactment are rational;
4. a rule that for a limit to come within section 1, it is
sufficient that the means used in the enactment are rationally
related to the achievement of the purposes, and
5. no rule requiring a proportionality between purposes and
effects.
The differences between the section 1 doctrine that the
justices developed and the alternative doctrine that I suggest may be
compared with the differences between the highest and lowest levels
of scrutiny that judges in the United States have developed in equal
protection jurisprudence.
Judges in the United States have
developed three approaches to judicial review of legislation under
the equal protection clause: low scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, and
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high or strict scrutiny. 20 5 The three levels of scrutiny embody three
standards of justification. The notion is that judges apply low
scrutiny in the general run of equal protection cases because they
wish to exercise judicial restraint and show deference to legislative
decisions.2 06 Judges apply strict scrutiny in cases where the
challenged legislation denies to those whom it affects a right
considered to be constitutionally "fundamental," or where the
legislation discriminates among people on the basis of a classification
considered to be "suspect," such as race.20 7 Judges apply strict
scrutiny in these cases because they wish to prohibit the legislative
denial of the fundamental right or the legislative use of the suspect
classification. Judges apply intermediate scrutiny in cases where the
challenged legislation affects interests considered to be "important"
but not "fundamental," or where the legislation uses a classification
considered to be "sensitive" but not "suspect," such as gender.20
Strict scrutiny is characterized by features similar to those
which characterize the doctrine developed by the justices of the
Supreme Court of Canada for the section 1 analysis. 2°9 Almost
invariably, when United States judges use strict scrutiny they
invalidate the challenged abridgement of the equal protection
clause. 210 Low scrutiny is characterized by features similar to those
211
which characterize the alternative doctrine I set out above.
Almost invariably, when United States judges use low scrutiny they

2 05

L.H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, (Mineola, N.Y.: Foundation Press, 1978) at
991-1000 (low scrutiny), 1000-60 (strict scrutiny) and 1057-97 (intermediate scrutiny). Torke,
supra, note 163 at 282-84. Dickson C.J. referred to the "two standards of equal protection
review" in the United States in his dissenting decision in Gay Alliance, supra, note 56 at 595.
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uphold the challenged abridgement of the equal protection clause.212
Intermediate scrutiny is characterized by features which are not as
demanding as those of high scrutiny but not as relaxed as those of
low scrutiny.2 13 When United States judges use intermediate
scrutiny the results are mixed; they uphold the legislation in some
cases and invalidate it in others.
Is it likely that Canadian judges will, as a formal doctrinal
matter, use different levels of scrutiny under section 1 of the
Charter as United States judges do under their Bill of Rights? A
possible textual basis in the Charter for the adoption of different
levels of scrutiny is the reference in section 1 to both
reasonableness and demonstrable justification in a free and
democratic society. In Oakes, Dickson cj. said little about the
relationship between the requirement of reasonableness and the
requirement of demonstrable justification. However, his invocation
of the words "demonstrably justified" to support his ruling that in
section 1 there is a heavy onus of proof on the party seeking to
limit,214 seems to suggest that demonstrable justification sets a
higher standard than does reasonableness. If that is so, the
requirement of reasonableness may point to low scrutiny, and the
requirement of demonstrable justification may point to strict
scrutiny.
Accordingly, if reasonableness and demonstrable
justification were alternative requirements in section 1, justices might
develop two standards of justification similar to low scrutiny and
strict scrutiny in United States jurisprudence. Further, justices might
develop rules to determine when to apply each approach, that is, to
determine what sorts of limits may come within section 1 as long as
they are reasonable, and what sorts of limits may come within
section 1 only if they meet the higher standard of demonstrable
justification. If the two requirements were alternatives, Canadian
judges would be in a position similar to that of judges in the United
States when they apply low scrutiny to some sorts of limits and strict
scrutiny to other sorts of limits.

212Tribe, supra, note 205 at 1082 and 1089.
213Ibid. at 1082-89; Torke, supra, note 163 at 283.
214see supra, text at notes 137-38.
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However, the language of section 1 makes this sort of
development unlikely.
In section 1, reasonableness and
demonstrable justification are cumulative not alternative
requirements. To hold that a limit comes within section 1, justices
must hold that it is both reasonable and demonstrably justified in a
free and democratic society. Accordingly, it is unlikely that justices
will ground the adoption of two levels of scrutiny or standards of
justification in the section 1 requirements of reasonableness and
demonstrable justification.
Canadian judges may, however, use the balancing of
legislative effects and purposes that is required by the third
component of the proportionality test,215 as the functional equivalent
of the levels of scrutiny in the United States. Indeed, judges may
use this balancing process to achieve a "sliding scale of review," that
is, an infinite number of levels of scrutiny instead of only three, a
position 6 that some justices and scholars in the United States
21

favour.

Judges may subject certain types of limits to a high level of
scrutiny by holding readily that the effects of these limits are severe,
and that the purposes of the enactments containing these limits are
not sufficiently important to be proportional to the effects. The
result of this reasoning is that these limits do not come within
section 1. Using this technique, judges may apply a high level of
scrutiny to limits on preferred rights and freedoms or preferred
classes of rights and freedoms,21 7 and to limits which impair a
principle considered integral to a free and democratic society.218
For example, (to borrow from the United States jurisprudence)
judges may apply a high level of scrutiny to limits which deny to a
class of persons a right considered to be "fundamental," and to limits
which affect persons identified by a classification considered to be
"suspect," by holding either that equality rights are preferred rights,

215See supra, text at notes 191-204.
216

rorke, supra, note 163 at 283.

217See supra, text at notes 199-200.
218See supra, text at notes 202-203.
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or that these limits impair a principle integral to a free and
democratic society. Judges may say of these limits that their effects
on the right or freedom limited are so severe that they are not
warranted by any legislative purposes.
Finally, a comment on the words "reasonable" and
"demonstrably justified" in section 1, and the relationship between
the two. First, each is an open-ended, general word capable of
many interpretations. The words are indeterminate and do not
control judicial decision making. As I suggest above, 219 justices
might have used the two words to develop section 1 doctrine quite
different in formal terms from the section 1 doctrine developed by
the Chief Justice in Oakes. Second, although the Chief Justice did
not examine at length the relationship between reasonableness and
demonstrable justification in Oakes, he seemed to suggest that
reasonableness imposes a lower standard of justification than does
demonstrable justification. 220 Third, "reasonableness" seems to be
included within "demonstrable justification." Judges may hold that
a limit is "reasonable" but not "demonstrably justified"; however, a
holding that a limit is "demonstrably justified" seems to presuppose
that it is "reasonable." For example, a holding that the means used
in a limiting enactment are the least restrictive means that achieve
the legislative purposes presupposes that the means are
rationally
221
related to the achievement of the legislative purposes.
This overlap between reasonableness and demonstrable
justification may be the reason that judges, on occasion, treat the
two as if they were one requirement. For example, in Oakes, the
Chief Justice did not distinguish between the two requirements
when he discussed the factors judges should consider when
determining whether the purposes of a limiting enactment are
reasonable and demonstrably justified.222 In the same decision,
when the Chief Justice discussed the assessment of the means used
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in a limiting enactment, although he isolated two factors, the first
and second components of the proportionality test, he did not
explicitly relate one to reasonableness and the other to
demonstrable justification. 223 In the B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference,
Lamer J. seemed to treat the two requirements as one by
integrating the word "reasonable" and the expression "demonstrably
justified in a free and democratic society." He said that the limiting
enactment considered in that decision comes within section 1 only
if it is "in a free and democratic society, under the circumstances, a
justified reasonable limit to one's rights under section 7.''224 In the
same decision, Lamer J. spoke of "a reasonable limit in a free and
democratic society."225
Notwithstanding the overlap between reasonableness and
demonstrable justification, judges may use the reasonableness
requirement alone. Judges may hold that the evidence and
argument necessary to support a finding that a limit is reasonable
may be less extensive than the evidence and argument necessary to
support a finding that a limit is demonstrably justified. For example,
judges may wish to examine parliamentary reports or the evidence
of expert witnesses on the latter issue, but not on the former. If
they determine that a limit fails to meet the lower standard of
reasonableness, they may hold that the limit does not come within
section 1 without undertaking what they may consider to be the
more complex analysis necessary to determine whether the limit
meets the higher standard of demonstrable justification. In Oakes
the Chief Justice relied on the reasonableness requirement alone to
assess the means used in the enactment. He held that the means (a
reverse onus clause requiring an accused found to be in possession
of drugs to prove that he/she was not in possession for the purpose
of trafficking) are not rationally related to the achievement of the

223See supra, text at note 183.
224SUpra, note 9 at 515. In Southam, supra, note 125, MacKinnon A.CJ.O. at 425 spoke

of determining whether a limit "has been demonstrably justified as a reasonable one"; and at
430 he concluded that the appellant "has not demonstrably justified the limit imposed by s.
12(1) as a reasonable one in this free and democratic society...."
225

B.C. Motor Vehicle Reference, ibid. at 521.
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purpose of the legislative provision.2 26 Therefore, he held that he
did not have to consider whether the2 means
meet the other two
27
components of the proportionality test.

226Supra, note 189.
227Supra, note 2 at 230.

